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The most important rule of all is the last sentence of 
[FRCP] 1, which provides that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure ‘shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action.’  It is this 
command that gives all the other rules life and meaning and 
timbre in the realist world of the trial court.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The primary purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) is “to economize time and expense in trying … suits.”2  That 
                                                 
* Mia Mazza is a partner, Emmalena K. Quesada is an associate, and Ashley L. Sternberg 
is a former associate, all in the San Francisco office of Morrison & Foerster, LLP.  They 
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Geoffrey Graber, Eric Brooks, Elizabeth J. 
Miles, Michael Sachdev, and Christopher Jeu to this article.  Mia also acknowledges her 
law partner Steven M. Kaufmann for his early teachings on the importance of FRCP 1.  
1 In re Paris Air Crash, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
2 Warnick v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Md. 1946).  
See also Des Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955) (stating that the primary 
purpose of the rules is to secure “speedy and inexpensive justice in a uniform and well 
ordered manner.”); Marin v. Knopf, 1 F.R.D. 436, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (“The real 
purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . is to eliminate technicalities, delays 
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mandate is articulated in FRCP 1, which requires that the FRCP “be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”3  In reality, few parties to litigation in 
federal court receive the prompt and economical resolution that FRCP 1 
seems to promise.  Nowhere is this more evident than in cases involving 
the discovery of large volumes of electronically stored information.4 
 
[2] Discovery of electronic information is now an everyday fact of 
litigation in the U.S.  Advances in computer software and hardware (e.g., 
e-mail, instant messaging, voicemail, blogs, laptops, .pdfs, PDAs, zip or 
flash drives, databases, and network servers) have greatly increased the 
ability to generate, replicate, circulate, and accumulate electronic 
information.  At the same time, however, those technological advances 
also have resulted in the exponential growth of electronically stored 
information (“ESI”) that may be relevant to, and is now routinely 
requested in, litigation.  It is estimated that more than 90% of all 
information today is created and retained in an electronic format.5 
 
                                                                                                                         
and expense and secure prompt and effective adjudication on the merits when a cause of 
action is set forth.”); Boysell Co. v. Colonial Coverlet Co. 29 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E. D. 
Tenn. 1939) (“[T]he intention of the new rules is to expedite litigation, to save cost and 
principally and primarily to reach justice by obtaining a full disclosure of the truth in 
connection with any controversy.”). 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  Throughout this article, references to “FRCP,” “Rules,” or “Rule” are 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  References to “Amendments,” “Amendment,” 
or “Amended” are to the FRCP amendments that were effective December 1, 2006. 
4 The authors are of the opinion that the ubiquitous term “e-discovery” will eventually, if 
not soon, become outdated.  The discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”) is 
fast becoming the norm, with companies often converting paper records into electronic 
format for storage, at times complete with semi-searchable text created through Optical 
Character Recognition (“OCR”) or other technology.  Accordingly, in time, the term “e-
discovery” should be retired so that litigants can go back to using the term “discovery.” 
5 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 
2005), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/RetGuide200409.pdf [hereinafter 
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES]; see also, e.g. Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 
WL 264004, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2002) (“E-mails have replaced other forms of 
communication besides just paper-based communication.  Many informal messages that 
were previously relayed by telephone or at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail”). 
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[3] Unfortunately for litigants, “the advantages of computerization in the 
business world—the reduction of costs and greater efficiency in recording, 
storing, manipulating and retrieving information—have not translated into 
advantages in discovery.” 6  The explosive growth of ESI has changed the 
very nature of discovery, with new electronic complexities making the 
preservation and production of evidence far more challenging.7  It is an 
accepted fact that “the discovery of computer-based information [can] cost 
more, take more time and create more headaches than conventional, paper 
based discovery.”8 
 
[4] There are several characteristics of ESI that can make its discovery 
particularly expensive and burdensome: 
 
• It is dynamic, and thus it can be altered or destroyed by the 
ordinary operation of a computer, often without the operator’s 
knowledge or direction.  
• It is persistent, and thus it can continue to exist despite apparent 
“deletion”—yet in a state that makes it difficult to locate, retrieve, 
or search. 
                                                 
6 Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, 7 FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS, 
Feb. 12, 2001, at 3.  
7 See Kemper Mortgage, Inc. v. Russell, No. 3:06-cv-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (S.D. 
Ohio April 18, 2006) (“Computers have become a standard tool of doing business, with 
many associated benefits and costs.  One of the benefits but also burdens is that it is 
easier to preserve a great deal of information than it was with paper systems.  One of the 
unexpected costs of using the electronic tool is that it may become costly to abide by 
one’s duty to preserve evidence.”); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, 229 F.R.D. 568, 572 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (“As contrasted with traditional paper discovery, e-discovery has the 
potential to be vastly more expensive due to the sheer volume of electronic information 
that can be easily and inexpensively stored on backup media . . . .  Depending on how the 
electronic data is stored, it can be difficult, and hence expensive, to retrieve the data and 
search it for relevant documents.”) (citations omitted). 
8 Withers, supra note 6, at 3.  See, e.g., Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 
229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (“[T]he cost of restoring, de-duplicating, and 
designing and conducting a search of all 996 backup tapes reasonably could be in the 
range of several million [dollars] . . . [not including] the costs of privilege review and 
actual production.”). 
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• It is dependent upon the technology that created it, and thus it can 
be incomprehensible when separated from that system.9 
• It is used and retained in a variety of different forms and in a 
multiplicity of locations (including servers, backup tapes, desktops, 
laptops, PDAs, home computers, and so forth), many of which are 
hard to reach. 
 
[5] Finally, the volume of ESI is staggering in comparison with 
conventional paper discovery.  It is not infrequent for a terabyte (i.e., 
1,000 gigabytes, 1 million megabytes, or 500 billion typewritten pages) of 
ESI to be at issue in large civil litigation or in government investigations.10  
The sheer magnitude and diversity of ESI that must be dealt with creates 
significant difficulties and costs for lawyers and litigants. 
 
[6] For example, the cost of responding to a discovery request can be in 
the millions of dollars if several years’ worth of archived e-mails and files 
must be located, preserved, restored, sorted through, and collected in a 
forensically sound manner.11  While companies retain vast amounts of 
ESI, much of it is stored for disaster-recovery purposes.12  Therefore, 
“[r]etrieving computer based records or data is not the equivalent of 
getting the file from a file cabinet or archives.”13  The cost of restoring 
certain types of electronic information to a readable, searchable, and 
reviewable form can be astronomical, particularly in light of the limited 
amount of relevant information that the exercise may ultimately yield.  
Finally, there is the time and cost to cull, de-duplicate, review, and cleanse 
the data to exclude or redact non-relevant or confidential material before 
production.  Assuming it takes a skilled attorney using available 
technology an average rate of one hour to review 100 documents, it would 
                                                 
9 COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23 (Sept. 2005), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf 
10 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4TH) § 11.446 (2004). 
11 Linda Volonino, Electronic Evidence and Computer Forensics, 12 COMM. ASS’N FOR 
INFO. SYS. 463 (2003), available at http://cais.isworld.org/articles/12-27/article.pdf. 
12 See, e.g., Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01 2004 WL 1949062, 
at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“electronic records [often] are not stored for the purposes of 
being able to retrieve an individual document” but rather “for emergency uploading into a 
computer system to permit recovery from catastrophic computer failure”). 
13 Id. 
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take him or her 5 years to review 1 million documents working 2,000 
hours per year. 
 
[7] At every stage of discovery, decisions must be made about where to 
devote money and resources.  Deep in the trenches of discovery and facing 
the task of collecting, reviewing, and producing millions of electronic 
documents, it is easy for attorneys to lose sight of the forest for the 
terabytes.  With the mounting volumes of ESI being created and stored, 
the practical reality is that discovery must become “not just about 
uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can 
afford to disinter.”14  Parties, lawyers, and judges have an opportunity 
today to begin taking creative new approaches to the discovery of ESI, 
with a renewed focus on the important (yet often neglected) mandate of 
FRCP 1. 
 
[8] This article discusses the directive of FRCP 1 (Section II) and 
articulates several practical approaches to cutting (Section III) and shifting 
(Section IV) the costs of the discovery of electronically stored 
information.  The authors posit that the approaches discussed herein are 
consistent with the command and spirit of FRCP 1, under which the 
“[c]ost of discovery is a pertinent and appropriate consideration.”15 
 
II. FRCP 1:  THE PROMISE OF A JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE 
DETERMINATION OF EVERY ACTION 
 
[9] FRCP 1 is “one of the least frequently cited, but most important”16 of 
all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17  It commands that the Rules “be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
                                                 
14 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
15 Butterworth v. Indus. Chem., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 585, 589 (N.D. Fla. 1991). 
16 United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 723 (E.D. Tex. 1981); see also N. River Ins. 
Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (calling 
FRCP 1 “important but often neglected”). 
17 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originally adopted in 1938 by the Supreme 
Court.  It was the result of the work of an Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme 
Court in 1935 pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 
(1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2071-74 (2006)). 
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determination of every action.”18  Those three aims are “a basic tenet of 
modern dispute resolution, an article of faith in Anglo-American civil 
procedure.”19  They are “complementary” attributes that must be 
considered in every case.20 
 
[10] The Supreme Court has observed that FRCP 1 reflects a “national 
policy . . . to minimize the costs of litigation.”21  The goal of reducing 
litigation costs is underscored by the 1993 amendment to FRCP 1, which 
clarifies that the Rules must be “administered,” as well as “construed,” to 
secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”22  
The Advisory Committee stated that “[t]he purpose of this revision . . . is 
to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority 
conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only 
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay.”23 
 
[11] The 1993 amendments to the FRCP were part of an ongoing effort 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to reduce the costs of litigation.  For 
example, at the time the Advisory Committee was working on the 1993 
amendments, Congress also was passing the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990 (CJRA).24  The CJRA was “rooted in more than a decade of concern 
                                                 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Liberian Oceanway Corp., 398 F. 
Supp. 104, 110 (D.P.R. 1975) (stating that courts are obligated “to construe the 
procedures in such a manner as to secure the fast, speedy and inexpensive determination 
of every action.”); Kenney v. Cal. Tanker Co., 381 F.2d 775, 777 (3rd Cir. 1967) 
(“[Courts] have the responsibility to secure the just and speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action”); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F. Supp. 825, 827 (E.D. 
Mich. 1944) (“It is the duty of the courts to construe the Rules of Civil Procedure so as to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”). 
19 Patrick Johnston, Problems In Raising Prayers to Level of Rule: The Example of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1326-27 (1995). 
20 Boe v. Lane & Co., 428 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (E.D. La. 1977). 
21 Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 234 (1964).   
22 FED. R. CIV. P 1 (emphasis added);  FED R. CIV. P. 1, comm. n (1993).  For a thorough 
discussion of the legislative history behind the 1993 Amendment to Rule 1, see Johnston, 
supra note 19, at 1325. 
23 FED R. CIV. P. 1, comm. n (1993). 
24 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 101-105, 104 Stat. 5089-98 
(1990). 
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that cases in federal courts take too long and cost litigants too much.”25  
Under the CJRA, federal courts are required to implement a “civil justice 
expense and delay reduction plan” to ensure a just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes.26 
 
[12] To achieve the outcome that FRCP 1 contemplates, the FRCP must 
be construed “liberally.”27  Nowhere is this more true than when the 
federal courts apply Rules governing discovery.  FRCP 1 has been cited in 
denying discovery that “would properly be characterized as a fishing 
expedition, causing needless expense and burden to all concerned.”28  
Courts also have held that the sharing of information obtained in discovery 
with litigants in comparable cases is consistent with FRCP 1, as it 
eliminates the time and expense of rediscovery.29  The directive of FRCP 
1 is thus clear:  “[t]he provisions governing discovery under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are more than mere procedural guidelines to be 
consulted at the pleasure of a party to a federal suit.  The language of these 
rules is carefully drafted and specific in its terms in order that they ‘secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”30 
 
[13] According to the Advisory Committee, the 1993 amendment to FRCP 
1 proclaimed the “central theme and purpose” of several contemporaneous 
Rule amendments, including “reducing excessive delays and expense in 
civil litigation; curtailing and eliminating frivolous claims and defenses; 
reducing burdens on litigants; and preserving scarce judicial resources.”31 
                                                 
25 James Kakalik, et al., Just, Speedy and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case 
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, INST. FOR CIVIL JUST. 1 (1996). 
26 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994). 
27 Plant Econ., Inc. v. Mirror Insulation Co., 308 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1962). 
28 N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F Supp 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). 
29 See, e.g., Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Mass 1990) (holding 
that sharing discovery is consistent with FRCP 1 and particularly appropriate in tobacco 
tort cases in which individual plaintiffs must litigate against large, corporate defendants); 
Wauchop v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 539, 546 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (explaining that 
the sharing of discovery materials furthers the goals of FRCP 1 by eliminating time and 
expense involved in discovery). 
30 Philpot v. Philco-Ford Corp., 63 F.R.D. 672, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (citation and internal 
quoted omitted). 
31 Johnston, supra note 19, at 1328.  
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III. PUTTING TECHNOLOGY TO WORK FOR YOU:  INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES 
FOR CUTTING THE COSTS OF ESI DISCOVERY 
 
[14] Even the 1993 Advisory Committee could not have imagined how 
prescient and relevant was its emphasis on cost-efficiency, or how far-
reaching the scope of its mandate, in view of the explosion of electronic 
data that was about to happen.  While “20 years ago PCs were a novelty 
and e-mail did not exist,” by the mid-1990’s most companies were fully 
embracing e-mail and other forms of ESI as essential components of 
business communications and operations.32  Today, e-mail is a 
fundamental and economical form of internal and external communication 
for many organizations.33  By some estimates, “more than 90 percent of all 
information is created in an electronic format.”34  Moreover, the growth 
rate of ESI is likely to accelerate rapidly over the next decade.35 
 
[15] As the veritable tidal wave of ESI hits, companies are learning of its 
dark side through the often painful experience of trying to harness it for 
use and production in litigation.  In theory, at least, many of the problems 
caused by advances in technology also can be solved or at least minimized 
by those same advances.36  Electronic data can be difficult to manage, but 
it “can also greatly reduce the costs of discovery and facilitate the pretrial 
preparation process.”37  When properly employed, “electronic discovery 
allows a party to organize, identify, index, and even authenticate 
                                                 
32 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 1. 
33 See, e.g., Byers v. Illinois State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *10 
(N.D. Ill. May 31, 2002) (“E-mails have replaced other forms of communication besides 
just paper-based communication.  Many informal messages that were previously relayed 
by telephone or at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail.”) 
34 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 1. 
35 Richard K. Herrmann, Vincent J. Poppiti & David K. Sheppard, Managing Discovery 
in the Digital Age: A Guide to Electronic Discovery in the District of Delaware, 8 DEL. L. 
REV. 75, 75 (2005). 
36 David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, at 
II. H. 1 (Feb. 2005). 
37 RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, CONFERENCE 
OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION iv (Review Draft, Sept. 2005). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 3 
 
 9
documents in a fraction of the time and at a fraction of the cost of paper 
discovery while virtually eliminating costs of copying and transport.”38 
 
[16] To that end, in recent years companies and counsel have taken 
advantage of one of the positive features of electronic data:  its 
searchability.  One of the most effective ways to reduce a large collection 
of data is through an electronic culling and vetting process.39  ESI search 
technologies and software allow litigants to “search through far more 
documents than human beings could hope to review manually.”40  While 
courts have, to some extent, endorsed search technology in discovery, the 
cases still lag far behind the available technology. 
 
[17] This section suggests pragmatic, innovative approaches to reducing 
the costs of the ESI discovery process, in furtherance of the “just, speedy, 
and inexpensive” resolution of parties’ disputes.  It focuses on the two 
most costly and burdensome aspects of ESI discovery:  document 
preservation and attorney review.  It also briefly discusses the need for 
companies to implement rigorous controls over data lifecycle management 
so that their electronically stored information does not become so 
voluminous as to be unmanageable when litigation hits.  With these 
approaches, companies and counsel can make use of the special features of 
ESI to work toward fulfilling the mandate of FRCP 1. 
 
[18] Even with the cost-cutting measures that search technologies provide, 
however, the fact remains that the more and more ESI there is to search, 
“the more expensive it is to discover all the relevant information.”41  To 
efficiently and effectively litigate in the electronic age, requesting parties 
should focus their search efforts on identifying and producing the most 
important portions of accessible and relevant ESI, rather than undertaking 
the Herculean task of trying to find and produce all responsive ESI.  
Conversely, requesting parties must give up the notion that they are 
entitled to every shred of relevant evidence, no matter how tangential 
 
                                                 
38 Id. at iv-v. 
39 Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery 
Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH 53 (2004). 
40 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 6. 
41 Zubulake v.UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).  
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A. KEYWORD SEARCHING 
 
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KEYWORD SEARCHING IN DISCOVERY 
 
[19] Long before the discovery of electronically stored information 
became part of everyday litigation, parties employed culling techniques 
during the document collection and pre-review processing stages of 
litigation to winnow down the overall volume of documents potentially 
relevant to a given litigation.  Typically, those filters involved date 
parameters, custodians, and file types unlikely to contain relevant 
information.  But given the exponentially greater (and ever-increasing) 
volume of ESI used and retained by companies in recent years, those 
traditional restrictions are no longer proving sufficient:  the amount of data 
left to review is still often prohibitively colossal, sometimes numbering in 
the terabytes.  The “cost and time required to have legal professionals read 
documents closely” for responsiveness, privilege, and other confidentiality 
concerns, especially “in the context of cases involving hundreds of 
thousands (or even millions) of pages of records, can be astronomical.”42  
Moreover, with the continued proliferation of vast quantities of ESI, there 
is an ever-increasing likelihood that responsive documents will not be 
located and “that some privileged records may slip through the review 
process.”43 
 
[20] To minimize these problems, parties and their counsel can take 
advantage of one of the more positive features of electronic data:  
“because it can be searched automatically, key words can be run for 
privilege checks” and to identify potentially responsive documents.44  
“Keyword searching can, at least in theory, assist in all aspects of e-
discovery.”45 
 
[21] As discussed herein, a keyword search is a method for culling down a 
large collection of ESI.  The producing party searches the collection for 
certain words, dates, or other parameters specified by a user and then—in 
                                                 
42 Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, 15 PRAT. LIT. 3, 9 (May 2004). 
43 Id. 
44 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.  
45 Bennett, supra note 42, at 10. 
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the most common application today—eliminates from attorney review 
those documents that do not contain those parameters.  Keyword searching 
“permits a party to search” a collection of documents “more efficiently.”46  
Narrowing a pool of data by using keywords, such as names, e-mail 
addresses, and business terms relevant to the subject matter of the 
litigation, allows for a “targeted and focused discovery search.”47   
 
[22] Parties should consider how keyword searches also may be used 
beyond the context of the culling down of data before attorney review.  A 
“significant benefit” of keyword searching is the potential “reduction in 
the burden and cost of electronic discovery (both in terms of locating and 
preserving relevant records, and in terms of identifying potentially 
privileged or confidential records).”48   Assuming that a company has or is 
willing to acquire (through assistance of a vendor or otherwise) 
technology that allows it to search for keywords in ESI, protocols can be 
established to develop and deploy search terms to assist in the process of 
identifying ESI to be preserved and/or collected for a particular litigation.  
Keywords also could be used to facilitate a more efficient and effective 
search for privileged, private, and confidential information in ESI.   
 
[23] Keyword searches are appropriate for identifying potentially 
privileged documents.49  At a minimum, keyword searching can 
immediately identify documents that contain the words “privileged” or 
“confidential.”50  A more sophisticated deployment of keyword searching 
could locate documents containing the names of relevant counsel, or other 
case-specific sensitive terms.51  Another appropriate situation to use 
keyword searching is where opposing counsel demands production of 
information on a specific subject.52  Keyword searching of ESI can also be 
particularly helpful where opposing counsel demands production of 
                                                 
46 Windy City Innovations, LLC v. American Online, Inc., No. 04 C 4240, 2006 WL 
2224057, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2006). 
47 Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE, 2006 WL 
3208579, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006).  
48 Bennett, supra note 42, at 12. 
49 Id.; see also Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
50 Bennett, supra note 42, at 12. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 13. 
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information on a specific subject. Applying traditional document 
production techniques to that situation would require extensive, time-
intensive, hands-on review of individual records one-by-one to identify 
responsive documents.53  A keyword search, by contrast, would greatly 
reduce the time and costs necessary to locate those documents.54 
 
2. ENDORSEMENT OF KEYWORD SEARCHING AND FILTERING BY THE 
COURTS 
 
[24] There is no real dispute that keyword searching, along with traditional 
filters such as date, custodian, and file type, can streamline the production 
of ESI.55  Courts increasingly have endorsed the use of keyword searches 
and filters as a necessary component of discovery.56  The use of search 
terms to reduce the volume of ESI at issue in a particular litigation matter 
“strikes a reasonable balance” between a requesting party’s needs and a 
producing party’s burden.57  “Indeed, a principle advantage of electronic 
information is that high-speed methods exist to determine the existence of 
patterns of words, thereby allowing the narrowing of searches for relevant 
information.”58 
 
[25] A growing body of law acknowledges and endorses the use of 
“performing a key word search,” to cull down the volume of ESI to be 
reviewed by attorneys, to “control costs” in the review and production of 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., In re CV Therapeutics, Inc., Sec. Litig, No. C-03-3709 SI 2006 WL 2458720, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Employment of search terms is a reasonable means of 
narrowing [production].”); FTC v. Ameridebt, Inc., No. C-058025JSWEDL, 2006 WL 
618563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that “e-mail could likely be screened 
efficiently through the use of electronic search terms that the parties agreed upon”).  
56 Exceptions to this rule have related to circumstances where keyword searching was not 
feasible due to the nature of the storage medium.  Yet notably, even these cases recognize 
that if keyword searching had been feasible, it would have been appropriate. See, e.g. 
Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. 97-192, 1999 WL 815818, at *11 (Mass. Aug. 27, 1999). 
57 In re CV Therapeutics, 2006 WL 2458720, at *2.  
58THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 44.  See also Lombardo v. Broadway Stores, 
Inc., No. G026581, 2002 WL 86810, at *8 (Cal. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (“Broadway urges 
the hard copy payroll documents were the same as the computerized data.  Not so.  The 
hard copy may have contained the same information, but the information was not equally 
accessible.”). 
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documents.59  The increasing familiarity of litigants with search 
technology—and with keyword searching in particular—has resulted in its 
adoption as an integral part of discovery in many cases.  In Medtronic 
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, the court noted that “[p]roducing 
electronic data requires, at a minimum, . . . designing and applying a 
search program to identify potentially relevant electronic files.”60  
Commentators proffer that “[n]o sophisticated party or attorney seriously 
contends that an electronic vetting process is unnecessary.”61 
 
[26] Case law makes it clear, however, that while keyword searches may 
be employed to more efficiently identify potentially relevant documents 
and cull down collections in a particular litigation, that should be done 
only after careful consideration of what keywords should be used.62  When 
keywords are properly developed, some courts are enthusiastic about the 
use of search terms in document review and production, deeming the 
procedure fair, efficient, and reasonable.63  It has also become common for 
courts and parties alike to fashion unique, individualized discovery 
protocols incorporating the use of keyword terms.64 
                                                 
59 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
60 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 552 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).  
61 Brownstone, supra note 39, at 26. 
62 See, e.g., Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL 
763668, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (noting the importance of formulating a detailed 
search protocol). 
63 Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. CIV. A. 00-981-RRM, 2002 
WL 818061 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002) 
64 Id; see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).  In Rowe, in light of the court’s decision to shift the costs of the 
discovery of e-mails to the plaintiffs, the court also decided to shift the responsibility for 
search, review, and even production of the e-mails to plaintiffs, the requesting party.  The 
court directed plaintiffs’ counsel to formulate a search procedure for identifying 
responsive e-mails, including specific word searches.  Id.  Plaintiffs were also responsible 
for reviewing the documents elicited by the search, identifying the e-mails they 
considered relevant, and providing those documents to defendants’ counsel in hard copy 
form with Bates stamps.  Defendants were permitted an after-the-fact opportunity to 
review the documents produced in order to designate them for privilege and 
confidentiality.  The court dismissed with privilege waiver concerns by holding that the 
fact that “a document has been reviewed by [opposing] counsel or by the expert shall not 
constitute a waiver of any claim of privilege or confidentiality.” Id.  
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[27] There is a key question, however, that has not yet been addressed in 
depth by courts:  may a responding party act “unilaterally” in creating and 
deploying search terms to winnow down a pool of data, or must there be a 
“bilateral” agreement between parties regarding search criteria before 
action is taken? 
 
[28] A good-faith unilateral approach to the development of keywords for 
filtering and culling ESI should be defensible in light of the well-
established principle that it is the province of the party producing material 
to “determine what is responsive to discovery demands.”65  As one court 
noted, this may “range from reading every word of every document to 
conducting a series of targeted key word searches,” but either way, “the 
producing party unilaterally decides on the review protocol.”66  The 
review protocol to be unilaterally developed by the producing party 
logically should include “defining the set of data” to be reviewed by 
selecting “reasonable search criteria, including search terms.”67  Sedona 
Principle No. 6 acknowledges the soundness of this approach:  
“[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, 
methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing 
their own electronic data and documents.”68 
 
[29] Some courts have endorsed a unilateral approach to deciding upon 
and employing search terms.69  Others, however, have required that the 
requesting party have an opportunity to provide “input . . . regarding 
proposed search terms.”70  Interestingly, even those courts still 
acknowledge that the producing party, “as custodian[] of the computer 
                                                 
65 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 31. 
66 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III). 
67THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 31. 
68 Id. at I, §6. 
69 See, e.g. Benson v. St. Joseph Reg'l Health Ctr., No. H-04-04323, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28795, at *14 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2006) (denying a motion to compel a full 
search of documents and for explanation of how the producing party searched archived 
material for documents and e-mails responsive to the requests, the court held that it was 
“unnecessary for [the producing party] to explain the details of their method of searching, 
when they have certified and represented to the Court that they have complied fully with 
[the requesting party’s] requests and made reasonable efforts to find and disclose all 
responsive documents and emails”). 
70 In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litg., 233 F.R.D. 88, 91 (D. Conn. 2005). 
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files,” “shall be responsible for . . . sifting through the data for responsive 
information” and may do so “in the most efficient manner possible.”  Thus 
while it may be permissible for a producing party to develop a list of 
keywords unilaterally to structure its search for responsive ESI, it may be 
preferable for that party to make some sort of effort to involve the 
requesting party in bilateral discussions before the search terms are 
deployed. 
 
[30] Treppel v. Biovail Corp. is an example of this approach.71  In Treppel, 
the court first relied on a line of cases to conclude that, compared to “hard 
copy” document review and production, keyword searching to filter and 
cull down a document collection is “more appropriate in cases involving 
electronic data, where the number of documents may be exponentially 
greater.”72  Biovail, the producing party, initially sought the plaintiff’s 
input in “defining the scope of any review of electronic records by 
stipulating which files would be searched and what search terms would be 
utilized.”  Treppel declined, however, “apparently believing that ‘the use 
of search terms has no application to the standard discovery process of 
locating and producing accessible hard copy and electronic documents.’”73  
The court deemed that a “missed opportunity” for the plaintiff, but still 
chided Biovail for failing to deploy its search protocol, noting that 
“[a]bsent agreement” with the plaintiff, “Biovail should have proceeded 
unilaterally” and produced “all responsive documents located by its 
search.”74  The court then ruled that Treppel could weigh in with “any 
specific concerns about the scope of the search.”75 
 
[31] Likewise, in In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., the court ordered 
the defendant to disclose to the plaintiff the search terms it used to reduce 
the “universe of extant electronic records in this case,” to give the plaintiff 
                                                 
71 Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
72 Id. at 374 (citing a line of cases approving keyword searches, including United States 
ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., No. 02 C 6074, 2005 WL 3111972, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 21, 2005) (approving of parties’ stipulated search terms to review e-mails)). 
73 Treppel, 233 F.R.D. at 374. 
74 Id. at 374. 
75 Id. at 375. 
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“an avenue to test or assess the scope of the search terms” used.76  When 
the plaintiff contested the adequacy of the search terms, however, the 
court held that the defendant’s unilateral development and use of keyword 
searches was a “reasonable means of narrowing the production in this 
instance” in light of the requesting party’s failure to “set forth an 
alternative search methodology” or otherwise bring any “specific 
challenge to the search terms.”77 
 
[32] Many cases are even more explicit about requiring parties to 
negotiate a mutually agreeable keyword list for filtering and culling as part 
of the discovery planning process, rather than proceed unilaterally.78  The 
trend toward bilateral discussions regarding, and/or mutual agreement in, 
the use of keyword search methodologies may find additional support in 
the recent amendments to the FRCP concerning discovery of 
electronically stored information, effective December 1, 2006 
(“Amendments”), which place emphasis on addressing discovery 
protocols openly, and as early as possible, in the litigation.79 
 
[33] There are, in sum, no bright-line rules regarding the development and 
use of keyword searches by a producing party.  It may well be that as the 
volume of ESI exponentially increases and it becomes more and more 
infeasible to conduct attorney review of ESI without first substantially 
culling down the data, keyword searching will become a standard 
component of litigants’ joint discovery plans.  In the meanwhile, 
                                                 
76 In re CV Therapeutics Sec. Litig., No. C-03-3709 SI 2006 WL 2458720, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 22, 2006). 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g. Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL 
763668, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (requiring parties to meet and confer in an attempt 
to agree on a formulation of appropriate search protocol, whether they would use 
keyword searches and/or other search procedures, and advising parties to “lean heavily 
on their respective computer experts in designing such a protocol”); Analog Devices, Inc. 
v. Michalski, No. 01 CVS 10614, 2006 WL 3287382 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) 
(directing producing party to conduct a word search using agreed-upon terms); United 
States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., No. 02 C 6074, 2005 WL 3111972, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2005) (endorsing negotiated keyword terms to be used in the review 
and production of e-mails). 
79 Brownstone, supra note 39 (advocating pre-production collaboration regarding specific 
selection criteria to be used in searches of the electronic data set). 
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producing parties should be free to take the lead in selecting and deploying 
keyword terms,80 keeping in mind that they may best follow the spirit and 
directives of FRCP 1 by being up-front with the opposing party regarding 
proposed search terms (and receptive to its input).  Where that is not 
possible, the producing party should, in an organized, methodical, and 
defensible fashion, unilaterally develop and use a keyword list to reduce 
the costs and burdens associated with attorney review of ESI.81  
 
3. MOVING BEYOND CASE LAW:  USE OF KEYWORD SEARCHING IN 
DOCUMENT PRESERVATION 
 
[34] While the use of keyword searching in discovery is generally 
accepted by courts, that judicial endorsement has, to date, mainly been 
limited to the pre-review culling phase.  Long before any ESI is collected 
or culled, however, keyword searches may offer similar efficiency benefits 
for the preservation of potentially relevant ESI, which is fast becoming a 
very complex and costly stage of discovery.82 
 
(A) THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF DOCUMENT PRESERVATION 
 
[35] While the duty to preserve evidence in the face of pending or 
anticipated litigation is not new,83 the explosion of ESI has deepened the 
impact of that duty.  The proliferation of e-mail and other forms of ESI in 
                                                 
80 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 31 (“There is no principled reason to require 
more intrusive efforts merely because the party seeking discovery is suspicious of the 
efforts undertaken by the producing party.”); see also McCurdy Group, LLC v. Am. 
Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed. Appx. 822, 831 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of 
motion to compel production of hard drives based on that party’s expression of 
skepticism that all relevant and non-privileged documents had been produced). 
81 Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
82 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 6; see also Isom, supra note 36. 
83 A party on notice that documents and information in its possession are relevant to 
pending or anticipated litigation matter has a duty to preserve those documents and data.  
See, e.g., Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984) (“While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its 
possession once a complaint is filed, it is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or 
reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, 
and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.”); JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., 
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.11, 93 n.125 (1989 & Cumulative Supp. 2006). 
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corporations has increased exponentially the volume of data potentially 
relevant to any litigation.84  This presents a particular challenge for large 
corporations that are constantly litigating multiple actions across different 
areas of law and various company departments.  Large companies have 
worked hard to keep up with their duty to preserve evidence, but it has 
been difficult and costly.  Each time a new litigation matter arises, or an 
existing matter expands in scope, the company is expected to initiate or 
expand a “litigation hold” on any manual or automatic processes that 
might delete relevant information, while the disposal of all non-relevant 
information continues.85  The decision of what to include in the scope of a 
“litigation hold” is thus of great importance.86  Once the scope of a 
litigation hold has been determined, it is up to a party and its counsel to 
take reasonable steps to see that sources of information within the scope 
are located and actually placed on hold during implementation.87 
 
[36] There is no entirely risk-free approach to preserving ESI for 
litigation.  While many companies traditionally have attempted to take a 
mechanical “save everything” approach to reduce the risk of spoliation, 
they now are realizing that saving “everything” is simply no longer 
feasible in light of the colossal volume of ESI, nor is it even a good idea.  
Over time, that approach eventually would compromise the company’s 
ability to meet its obligation to preserve and produce relevant evidence in 
litigation:  as the volume of data being “held” for litigation grows to an 
                                                 
84
 Mia Mazza & Ashley Sternberg, “Good Faith” Safe Harbor of FRCP 37(f) to Prevent  
Drowning in Zubulake?, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., COMM. ON TRIAL EVIDENCE 1 (Winter 
2007).  
85 See, e.g. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(Zubulake IV) (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine 
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the 
preservation of relevant documents.”); DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, 
Inc., No. 03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172 , at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005) (“[N]ormal 
procedures for destruction of documents must . . . be suspended when a party is on notice 
that they may be relevant to litigation, and the failure to make an adequate search of such 
documents before their destruction may be evidence of bad faith.”); Rambus, Inc. v. 
Infineon Tech., 220 F.R.D. 264, 281 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
86 Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84. 
87 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake 
V); see also Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic. Res. Corp., 446 F.Supp.2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
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unmanageable size, it becomes increasingly difficult to find the 
information that is “relevant” to any particular case.88 
 
[37] The need for a more efficient and effective approach to preservation 
has been driven home for companies by the increased rate at which 
requesting parties are seeking sanctions for alleged spoliation of ESI.89  A 
range of negative consequences can follow from a company’s failure to 
preserve evidence, including monetary sanctions, evidence or issue 
preclusion, adverse inference jury instructions, and even outright 
dismissal.90  One notorious example is Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.91  
In April 2005, a jury awarded damages of more than $29 million against 
UBS Warburg (“UBS”) after the court ruled that UBS’s preservation 
efforts had failed to prevent the disposal of certain relevant, responsive 
documents and gave the jury an adverse inference instruction.92 
 
[38] In light of cases like Zubulake and the evolving complexity of ESI, 
companies are now taking more substantial steps than in the past to ensure 
proper document preservation and to avoid discovery sanctions.  This 
means that companies and counsel must make critical decisions early on—
often before any litigation is filed—about where potentially relevant ESI 
may be located, and what must be done to preserve it for litigation.  For 
large companies that create high volumes of ESI and that are constantly in 
numerous litigation matters at once, compliance with (and concern about) 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (holding that requiring a company to retain 
every shred of electronic and paper documents upon notice of potential litigation would 
“cripple large corporations” who are “almost always involved in litigation”). 
89 See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to 
preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable 
litigation.”). 
90 See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding a 
dismissal the appropriate sanction for plaintiff’s failure to discharged duty to prevent 
spoliation of evidence); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 291 (E.D. Va. 
2001) (holding that adverse inferences respecting substantive testimony and credibility of 
experts was the appropriate sanction for spoliation).  Further, any knowing destruction of 
documents sought in litigation may be punished by lengthy prison sentences. See, e.g. 18 
U.S.C. § 1512 (c).  
91 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 422. 
92 Id. at 439-40.  See Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84 (discussing Zubulake, new Rule 
37(f), and their implications for future cases involving sanctions for spoliation). 
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the rigor now required in document preservation can be overwhelming.  
That has translated into a phenomenon of companies spending a great deal 
of time and money on the purchase and implementation of additional 
software, hardware, and other technology infrastructure, and the hiring of 
personnel tasked solely with the responsibility of preserving ESI for 
litigation, in an attempt to increase the likelihood that sources of 
potentially relevant ESI will be identified and retained for each new 
litigation matter that arises.93  This costly practice simply cannot be 
reconciled with the mandates of FRCP 1. 
 
[39] Rule 37(f), adopted with the FRCP Amendments, provides that 
sanctions under Rule 37 cannot be imposed on a party “for failing to 
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, 
good-faith operation of an electronic information system,” absent 
exceptional circumstances.94 The Advisory Committee note to Rule 37(f) 
does not shed any light on what qualifies as “the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system,” but it may signal a shift 
away from essentially expecting parties to do a perfect job of preserving 
ESI for litigation and toward a focus on whether parties have exercised 
“good faith” in their efforts to preserve potentially relevant ESI.95 
 
(B) KEYWORD SEARCHING AS PART OF A REASONABLE, GOOD-FAITH 
APPROACH TO DOCUMENT PRESERVATION 
 
[40] In light of the excessive costs and burdens now associated with 
document preservation, courts have acknowledged and held that 
companies need not preserve “every scrap of paper” in their files to 
comply with preservation obligations.96  Companies can only strive to 
                                                 
93 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 14, cmt. 2.b (“[T]he non monetary 
costs,” including “the burdens on information technology personnel and the resources 
required to review documents” should also be considered).  For example, large 
companies are now commonly finding it necessary to purchase a server whose sole 
purpose is to store preserved data for a particular litigation, which alone can cost nearly 
half a million dollars, or more.  Telephone Interview with Discovery Vendor (Dec. 12, 
2006). 
94 FED R. CIV PRO. 37(f) 
95 See Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84. 
96 Danis v. USN Comm., Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
23, 2000). 
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make reasonable, good-faith efforts to preserve ESI for litigation, and that 
includes the process by which they locate potentially responsive ESI to be 
preserved.97  Zubulake anticipated that companies would need to “be more 
creative” in the way they locate documents within the scope of their duty 
to preserve.98  “In recognition of the fact that there are many ways to 
manage electronic data,” the court stated that “litigants are free to choose 
how [the task of preserving relevant documents] is accomplished.”99 
 
[41] Sedona Principle 11 also reflects the need for innovative solutions in 
the preservation context: 
 
A responding party may satisfy its good faith obligation to 
preserve and produce potentially responsive electronic data 
and documents by using electronic tools and processes, 
such as data sampling, searching, or the use of selection 
criteria, to identify data most likely to contain responsive 
information.100 
 
The key factor is that companies undertake the preservation obligation in a 
reasonable, good-faith, well thought-out manner, in consideration of the 
facts of the litigation at issue.101  Decisions “relating to legal standards like 
‘potentially relevant data’ are made every day by lawyers in a wide variety 
of contexts.”102  This includes companies and their counsel making 
judgment calls regarding which methods are reasonable and which are far 
                                                 
97 Bennett, supra note 42, at 10.  
98 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
99 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
100 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5 at 39, prin. 11.  
101 Id. at 27, cmt 6.b. (“[O]rganizations should define the scope of the data needed to 
appropriately and fairly address the issues in the case and to avoid unreasonable 
overbreadth, burden, and cost.  Important steps in achieving the goal of reasonably 
limiting discovery may include collecting data from repositories used by key players 
rather than generally searching through the entire corporate computer system; defining 
the set of data to be collected by applying reasonable selection criteria, including search 
terms.”). 
102 John L. Carroll & Kenneth J. Withers, Observations on “The Sedona Principles,” at 4 
(Apr. 2003), available at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/sedona/observations.pdf. 
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too burdensome to endure.  When electronic records are voluminous, a 
keyword search should be employed where feasible.103 
 
[42] Through the use of keyword search technologies, a company may 
gain some assurance that it has made adequate good-faith efforts to 
comply with its obligation to locate and preserve potentially relevant 
information, while at the same time avoiding “the overwhelming burden 
of either preserving everything that exists in electronic form, or 
conducting a laborious page-by-page review of electronic records to 
determine what must be preserved.”104 
 
[43] Zubulake is in accord.105  There, the court explicitly suggested that in 
fulfilling the preservation obligation counsel should consider using a 
system-wide keyword search to locate potentially relevant documents.106  
A copy of each “hit” could then be preserved and segregated to provide a 
pool of potentially relevant documents for later responses to discovery 
requests.107 
 
[44] Where keyword search technology is employed to facilitate document 
preservation, parties should consider adopting a more conservative 
approach than they would in the review stage of discovery.  This is 
because the filtering out of documents that do not meet various keyword 
search criteria will be permanent.  The parties will not have the ability to 
go back and redefine the scope of their search terms, as they would during 
the review stage, so companies and their counsel should choose 
objectively broad criteria to guard against potential spoliation claims.  In 
other words, when using keywords for preservation purposes, search terms 
should be constructed with the intent of reaching ESI that is potentially 
relevant, and not just ESI that is relevant, in order to maximize 
defensibility.108  (Later on, a narrower set of keyword search terms should 
be applied to cull down the data set to a volume that feasibly may be 
                                                 
103 Bennett, supra note 42, at 10. 
104 Id. at 11.  
105 Zubulake V, 299 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Wm. T. 
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
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reviewed by attorneys.)  To that end, companies should consider keyword 
searching as a tool to be used in conjunction with traditional preservation 
efforts such as identifying relevant custodians and locating the ESI that 
they created and reviewed during the relevant time period. 
 
[45] In further support of defensibility, a party should make sure there is 
quality control and oversight in executing keyword searches.  If it appears 
that a particular search is not returning responsive documents, a company 
should modify its search parameters or take other measures to ensure 
appropriate preservation.  Also, a party should carefully document the 
search protocol employed.  These, along with any other visible efforts a 
company can make to show that it made reasonable efforts to fulfill its 
preservation obligation in good faith, should go a long way toward 
warding off any future claims of spoliation, and position a party to invoke 
the protections in new FRCP 37(f).109 
 
4. LIMITATIONS OF KEYWORD SEARCHING 
 
[46] While keyword searching has been embraced by courts, counsel, and 
parties alike, it is by no means an “e-discovery panacea.”110  There are 
challenging problems associated with using keyword searching, many of 
which are inherent to the available technology.  Perhaps foremost among 
the limitations of keyword searching is the risk that the chosen search 
terms will result in a low recall rate of potentially relevant documents.111  
                                                 
109 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system.”). 
110 Bennett, supra note 42, at 13. 
111 The recall rate “is a measure of the ability of a given retrieval methodology to find all 
of the potential responsive documents in a given collection.” Jason R. Baron, Toward a 
Federal Benchmarking Standard for Evaluating Information Retrieval Products Used in 
E-Discovery, 6 SEDONA CONFERENCE J. 237, 242 (2005).  Recall and precision are 
important performance measurement terms in information retrieval. See Matt Deniston, 
Concept Searching Whitepaper, at 4 (Jan. 2003), 
http://www.litigationready.com/pdfFiles/concept_searching.pdf. (“Precision is a measure 
of the system’s ability to return only relevant documents from amongst all the documents 
in a given collection.  It answers the question, ‘Is what I found relevant to what I was 
looking for?’ For example, if a search engine lists 80 documents found to match a query 
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Lawyers and experts struggle with formulating keyword search terms that 
will locate the largest possible number of potentially relevant documents 
without generating so many “hits” that the company essentially must 
preserve or review everything. 
 
[47] First, people often do not use the same terms to describe the same 
idea.  It can be very difficult, if not impossible in some circumstances, to 
identify every single word that relates to a relevant topic.  Consequently, 
keyword searches often fail to be as broad as a particular concept requires.  
For example, a keyword search could include “car,” but neglect 
“automobile,” “Jeep,” or “wheels.”  Because a keyword search is only as 
broad as the exact terms used, it is safe to assume that it will miss, or fail 
to recall, many relevant documents. 
 
[48] Second, anyone who has ever used a Boolean search engine knows 
the importance and the difficulty of framing queries to maximize the recall 
rate of responsive documents.  Building proper queries is a crucial step in 
the discovery process when keyword searches are employed to locate 
relevant documents.  It “requires mastering the subtleties of ANDing and 
ORing terms in order to arrive at a list of documents worth reviewing.”112  
In addition, varying search engines often require slightly differing 
syntaxes for the construction of Boolean search terms.  Accordingly, 
converting document requests into “a syntactically correct Boolean query” 
can challenge “even the most seasoned expert searcher.”113  In the words 
of one court, “[k]eyword searches are limited because they are literal and 
search only for an exact sequence of characters.  Thus, they do not pick up 
                                                                                                                         
but only 20 of them are relevant, then the Precision would be 25%.  Recall is a measure 
of how well the system can find all of the relevant documents in the database.  It answers 
the question, ‘How much is out there?’  For example, there may be 100 matching 
documents, but a search engine may only find 80 of them.  It would then list these 80 and 
have a recall of 80%.”)  Id. at 3.  
Id. The relationship between recall and precision “is an inverse one:  increasing the recall 
rate invariably leads to a corresponding loss of precision, as more and more documents 
are retrieved to find the elusive remaining needle in the rest of the haystack.” Baron, at 4.   
112 Deniston, supra note 111, at 3. 
113 Id. 
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variations or misspellings of words or names.” 114  These kinds of errors 
easily can lead to protracted discovery disputes later on down the road.115 
 
[49] Third, keyword searching naturally results in “false positives,” 
making any given search overinclusive from the outset.  For example, the 
word “water” may also bring up search results that are totally unrelated to 
the meaning of the word you are searching for, such as “Water St.,” 
“watered down,” or “John Waters.”  When dealing with a large universe of 
documents, it can be problematic when a keyword search generates “large 
numbers of nonresponsive records (along with responsive ones), all of 
which [need] to be sorted out through a labor-intensive manual review 
process.”116  This kind of result may, to some extent, defeat the efficiency 
rationales behind using a keyword search in the first place.117 
 
[50] Finally, it is important for a company to recognize that in all 
likelihood it will need to perform multiple keyword searches across its 
various data systems, as equipment and platforms are not always 
compatible.  “Unfortunately, there is no simple ‘universal translator’ for 
all this information.”118  When electronic information is maintained in 
different formats and stored in multiple locations, separate searches are 
typically required for each format and location.119  In many locations, 
keyword searching may not be feasible at all.120 
                                                 
114 United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 50 (D. Conn. 2002). 
115 See, e.g., Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. 
502003CA005045XXOCAI , 2005 WL 679071, at *7 (entering default judgment against 
producing party for a host of discovery abuses, including failure to identify and timely 
disclose script errors in search terms that prevented it from locating responsive 
documents). 
116 Baron, supra note 111, at 237 (describing in detail the problems arising from 
overbroad keyword searches in two cases). 
117 Id. 
118 Bennett, supra note 42, at 14. 
119 Id.  
120 See, e.g., United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 50 (D. Conn. 
2002) (“Keyword searches are also limited because they cannot be conducted on all files, 
such as image files that contain scanned documents or faxes.”). See also Public Citizen, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[B]ecause the database that 
was searched could not be relied upon to contain the requested information, it follows 
that no amount of searches of that database could be relied upon to turn up that 
information.”). 
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[51] Companies will need to account for the deficiencies associated with 
keyword searching and adapt their procedures accordingly.  Deciding what 
to search for and executing the search must be the result of intensive 
strategy considerations.  It is a challenging task, but is not 
insurmountable.121  The search terms employed “must be reasonably 
calculated to return relevant data.”122  It may even be necessary to engage 
an expert who could ensure that the search terms are properly constructed 
and are compatible with all relevant systems.  If the search is not done 
properly, courts may order additional searches, which will increase the 
cost and burden of discovery.”123 
 
B. CONCEPT SEARCHING 
 
[52] There can be no doubt that electronic search methodologies, as a 
means of culling down a data set for discovery, are here to stay.  While 
keyword searching certainly has its place in winnowing down ESI in a 
cost-effective and speedy manner, and the technology currently is 
available through many vendors and software providers, it also leaves 
something to be desired in terms of both recall and precision.124  Another, 
more recent development in search technology is concept searching, a 
promising alternative or complement to keyword searching.   
 
[53] As of this writing, concept search tools have not been developed or 
marketed widely for integration into corporate computer systems and thus 
they typically are not used in-house for preservation or other initial stages 
of discovery.  Concept search technology software, however, currently is 
available (at a price) for use in litigation to cull down and/or organize 
collections of ESI before attorney review.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Bennett, supra note 42, at 13. 
122 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 54. 
123 Id.; see also In re Amsted Indus., Inc., No. 01 C 2963, 2002 WL 31844956, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002) (ordering additional, comprehensive searches after finding word 
searches already employed to be insufficient.). 
124 See Deniston, supra, note 111, at 14. 
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1. CONCEPT SEARCH TECHNOLOGY 
 
[54] Concept search technology takes keywords to a whole new level.  
Unlike keyword search systems that match precisely what you type in and 
nothing more, “concept search systems strive to determine what you 
mean.”125  Concept searching aims to improve upon the performance 
limitations of keyword searching by using sophisticated statistical and 
linguistic models to understand the meaning behind search terms.  This is 
done by identifying word patterns and occurrences in documents, which 
are then translated into “concepts.”126  The concept search tool then 
compares those “concepts” across the document set, looking for 
relationships between documents.127 
 
[55] Unlike traditional Boolean operators like “AND,” “OR,” and “!,” 
concept searching does not require any particular syntax or formatting.  
Users can enter words, sentences, even whole documents (such as 
document requests or complaints), and the technology will return a list of 
potentially related documents, often ranked by relevancy, or of custodians 
with the most “hits.”128  By allowing lawyers to search for ideas as well as 
words, potentially relevant documents can be located even if specifically 
identified keywords do not appear in them.  Conversely, concept search 
engines are “smart enough” to exclude irrelevant documents even if a 
potentially relevant “concept” does appear in them.129  For example, if a 
reviewer entered “‘fired from job’ into a concept search engine, the engine 
is smart enough to exclude information such as flames, smoke and 
fireplaces.  The concept search will also expand the search to dismissal, 
separation, layoff, suspension, etc.”130  Essentially, concept searching is 
akin to “using a massive dictionary of the English language to find 
synonyms and related words.’”131  Many concept search tools also operate 
much like a massive dictionary of the language used by a company and in 
                                                 
125 Id. at 2. 
126 Kristin M. Nimsger & Michele C. S. Lange, E is for Evidence: Examining Recent E-
Discovery Developments, 23 NO. 2 GPSOLO 40, 44 (Mar. 2006). 
127 Id. 
128 Telephone Interview with Discovery Technology Vendor (Dec. 14, 2006). 
129 Deniston, supra note 109, at 2. 
130 Id. 
131 Baron, supra note 111, at 240. 
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the larger document collection being searched, for example to identify 
code names for projects or nicknames for people at the company. 
 
[56] There are several different theoretical approaches to finding data 
through concept searching.  There are mathematical or statistical 
approaches,132 which often use probability applications to locate and rank 
related topics.  Other approaches include linguistics or taxonomy.133  Each 
has its own set of strengths and weaknesses.134  Accordingly, most concept 
search software blends together some combination of the approaches to fit 
the needs of a particular litigation and to optimize precision and recall of 
relevant documents.135  The goal is for the technology to come as close as 
possible “to modeling how humans parse text for semantic meaning.”136 
 
[57] When combined with traditional Boolean keyword searching, these 
search technologies provide a powerful tool for lawyers to substantially 
reduce the costs of discovery.  The technologies allow litigants to decrease 
significantly the amount of material that must be reviewed by attorneys (or 
preserved in the first instance), and allow lawyers to identify and review 
the most relevant documents more quickly and accurately.  “Theoretically, 
as technology improves, retrieving and searching data will become more 
standard and less costly.”137 
 
                                                 
132 Deniston, supra note 111, at 4-9 (discussing different mathematical and statistical 
models used in concept search technology and stating that mathematical models are better 
are handling large data collections (measured in terabytes) than other approaches). 
133 Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group 
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006).  A taxonomy approach relies on an 
“if this, then that” approach.  For example, with the word “pitch” you would retrieve 
general categories such as baseball, roofing, sales, etc.  If you next selected “baseball,” 
you would get “fastball,” “curve,” “throw,” and so on, all clustered around baseball.  A 
linguistic approach, in addition to focusing on context and circumstances of use of words 
in language, relies on statistical applications and also looks at the practices and activities 
in which the words and phrases are used. 
134 Id. 
135 Telephone Interview, supra note 126.  Indeed, the concept search tools that many 
vendors use are a blend of mathematical, statistical, and linguistic approaches.  
136 Deniston, supra note 111, at 8. 
137 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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2. HOW CONCEPT SEARCHING CAN AMPLIFY THE EFFICIENCIES OF 
KEYWORD SEARCHING 
 
[58] Concept searching is able to do what keyword searching does, and 
more.  Among experts, it is thought to be a better and more useful 
application in that it may offer parties a better chance than keyword 
searching of locating relevant documents.138  A concept search will return 
documents that relate to the same idea as the query word, sentence, or 
paragraph, making it arguably a more reliable method of locating 
responsive documents.139 
 
[59] Keyword searching is a great “brute force” way to find exact 
matches.140  If litigants need to identify documents containing certain 
names or terms, then keyword searching can be an essential and powerful 
tool to find that information.141  If, on the other hand, a party needs to 
identify responsive documents and has a less refined sense of which 
documents could be responsive, then concept searching might be a better 
option.  For example, upon receiving a document request, rather than 
constructing and executing complex keyword searches, concept searching 
would let a party copy and paste the relevant part(s) of the request into the 
search software.  Shortly thereafter the party would have a list of every 
conceptually-related document, including documents that didn’t contain 
any of the specific words that were “pasted” into the software.142 
 
[60] The use of concept searching in discovery is, to the knowledge of the 
authors, currently limited to attorney review and (in fewer instances) pre-
review culling.  As the technology becomes more widely available, 
however, it also could be useful in identifying documents to preserve for 
anticipated litigation.  As discussed above, the preservation obligation 
presents a vexing challenge for large companies that, at the time the duty 
                                                 
138 Telephone Interview with Discovery Vendor (Nov. 27, 2006); Telephone Interview 
with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group on Methods for Search 
and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006). 
139 Id.  Most search technologies allow for further control of the returned results, such as 
de-duplication or grouping of emails by custodian or chain. 
140 Deniston, supra note 111, at 3. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 2. 
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to preserve arises, may not have received a complaint or preservation 
letter. Yet, they are nevertheless expected to identify and safeguard all 
information that may turn out to be potentially relevant.143  Concept 
searching could be used as a tool or safeguard mechanism in this context 
by counsel, along with traditional preservation methods, to ensure the 
widest recall of potentially relevant documents.  For example, counsel 
could paste phrases and paragraphs from a complaint, preservation letter, 
or newspaper article into the search tool, and the concept search would 
identify relevant documents and further detail which custodians had the 
greatest number of relevant document “hits.”  This could serve as a 
starting point for preservation, or as a final sweep, depending on the 
situation. 
 
[61] Using concept search technology instead of keyword searching is 
particularly appropriate in cases that cannot be easily reduced to specific 
terminology, or that are complex in nature.  For example, in cases that 
center on wrongful behavior, such as sexual harassment, it can be 
challenging to identify search terms that adequately describe harassing 
behavior.144  Concept searching could locate relevant ESI that relates to, 
rather than contains, specific words. 
 
[62] Concept search technology could also be used to further minimize the 
risk that the most sensitive documents—those that are privileged, private, 
confidential, or otherwise protected from discovery—do not get into the 
hands of the opposing party.  Some commentators suggest that the nature 
and volume of discovery in the era of electronic information make it likely 
that old attorney-client privilege issues will need to be examined in a new 
light.145  As the volume of documents requested and produced increases, 
the results are twofold in the privilege context.  First, privilege review is 
more costly and time-consuming than ever.  Second, even with a 
comprehensive privilege review, the sheer volume of documents requested 
and produced increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
                                                 
143 Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84. 
144 See, e.g., Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, 229 F.R.D. 568, 570-72 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(noting the low responsive rate in a sexual harassment case where parties used agreed-
upon keyword list including “sex,” “kiss,” “breast,” “porn,” “behavior,” “discipline,” 
“inappropriate,” and “oral”). 
145 Isom, supra note 36, at 11. 
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information.146  Instead of entering into potentially risky “quick peek” 
agreements and in addition to “clawback” agreements,147 parties could use 
concept search technology to supplement attorney review to guard against 
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged and confidential documents.  This 
would be especially appropriate in a large matter, where all of the 
confidential terms, such as attorneys’ names, are not known, and therefore 
could be missed using a keyword search. 
 
3. DEFENDING THE USE OF CONCEPT SEARCH TECHNOLOGY 
 
[63] There is a perception that discovery of electronic information is the 
“wild, wild west”148 of modern litigation.  This largely may be due to the 
fact that the development of technologies used in the discovery of 
electronic information far outpaces the developing law of discovery.149  As 
a result, many of the cutting-edge technologies available to meet the 
demands of modern discovery have no judicial decisions to support their 
employment.  Litigants are therefore understandably wary of using them. 
 
[64] Unlike keyword search technology, concept searching has not yet 
been vetted by the courts.  While keyword searching is familiar to judges, 
“it’s very difficult to explain to a judge that a lawyer has searched 
thoroughly when it’s difficult to explain how concept search technology 
                                                 
146 To some extent, the recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect 
these new realities by enacting provisions that promote flexibility among parties and 
increased protection with respect to privilege.  For example, amendments to Rule 
16(b)(6) contemplate an agreement for waiving privilege in a scheduling order.  
Likewise, new Rule 26(f) makes specific reference to discovery planning around 
privilege, as does Rule 26(b). 
147 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, cmt. 10.d. (“In a ‘clawback’ (or ‘quick 
peek’) production, documents are produced to the opposing party before or without a 
review for privilege, confidentiality, or privacy.  The key component of such a production 
is the ‘clawback’ agreement, in which the parties set stringent guidelines and restrictions 
to prevent the waiver of confidentiality and privilege.  The assumption of the parties to 
such a ‘clawback’ agreement is that if the requesting party finds a document that appears 
to be privileged, the producing party can “claw back” the document without having 
waived any privilege.”). 
148 See Ross Chafin, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and 
Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 115 (2006).  
149 Isom , supra note 36, at 10. 
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works.”150  Nevertheless, courts do recognize that there are various ways 
to manage electronic documents, and thus many ways in which a party 
may comply with its obligations.151  Parties are expected to conduct 
reasonable and adequate searches of their data.  So long as a party (or an 
independent third party vendor) can demonstrate the reasonableness of the 
approach employed for a given litigation, a party can defend its use of a 
particular search technology.  As concept searching technology becomes 
standardized, and increasingly familiar to litigants, one may expect that 
courts will demonstrate a willingness to adopt concept searching as part of 
the discovery process.152 
 
[65] This issue does, however, signal that where possible, a party should 
attempt to discuss or negotiate appropriate search methodologies, 
including concept searching, with the opposing party.  Courts are far less 
likely to question the propriety of a given search technology if both parties 
are in agreement that it is reasonable to expect the search methods used 
will retrieve relevant information.  To the extent parties in litigation 
determine that the use of concept search technology is a mutually 
agreeable means for achieving both the producing and requesting parties’ 
goals of increasing speed and decreasing the cost of document production, 
they also should discuss whether the cost of that technology should be 
split rather than borne solely by the responding party. 
 
[66] Moreover, critical to understanding and defending the use of cost-
cutting search strategies is the recognition that it is impossible to frame 
and execute any search strategy—human or technological—with 
perfection.  There is already a pronounced level of unreliability and 
guesswork involved in a traditional full-scale document review process.  
For example, sorting and reviewing documents by custodian and date can 
be very problematic:  from the reviewer’s perspective, the documents 
appear randomly and often out of context, making it difficult to 
                                                 
150 Jason Krause, Grasping the Concept: The Best Tool for Discovery is Still a Good 
Lawyer’s Brain, 91 A.B.A.J. 59, 59 (July, 2005). 
151 See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, cmt. 6.a. 
152 See Bennett, supra note 42, at 16. 
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consistently spot relevant documents.153  Likewise, it is difficult to ensure 
consistency across the board where a bevy of reviewers, all with different 
thought processes and judgments as to what may be relevant, are involved 
in the document review. 
 
[67] Technology will not solve these reliability concerns, but its goal is to 
improve upon them and reduce the costs of discovery at the same time.154  
Indeed, keyword and concept searching may make locating responsive 
documents even more reliable insofar as the search results can organize 
documents by their content.155  Concept-based review of documents 
arguably allows for a speedier review with increased chances of spotting 
relevant documents in context with one another and the document set as a 
whole, thereby furthering the directives of FRCP 1.  Ultimately, “the 
technology may become so cheap and so ubiquitous that litigants may 
demand” that keyword and concept searching “be adopted as an essential 
part of most-e-discovery.”156 
 
[68] But litigants looking for some kind of “holy grail” in search 
technology will not find it.157  There is not, to date, any gold standard for 
reliability in the discovery of electronic information.  Even vendors of 
search technology software are quick to point out that search technology is 
not a solution in and of itself, and it only goes so far as the imagination 
                                                 
153 Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group 
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006). 
154 Some studies comparing how human review measures up against automated search 
techniques suggest that lawyers using only themselves as reviewers fail to do as well as 
automated techniques in finding relevant documents. Baron, supra note 111, at 243.  But 
see Telephone Interview with Discovery Vendor (Nov. 27, 2006) (noting that other 
studies indicate that even the most advanced tools may miss a large percentage of 
documents that a human would have assessed to be relevant.  Another cost-cutting review 
option offered by vendors is a systemic automated document review that may eliminate a 
“first-level review” by attorneys for responsive documents.  This kind of review protocol 
focuses on some of the challenges of search technology, namely, consistency and quality 
assurance, both human nature challenges.  Comprehensive studies are underway to test 
the hypothesis that automated search and retrieval tools can “meet or beat existing human 
search and retrieval techniques.”).  
155 Baron, supra note 111 at 243.  
156 Bennett, supra note 42, at 16. 
157 Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group 
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006). 
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and adeptness of the lawyer using it.158  As “with any technology, it is 
imperative to perform frequent, thorough checks to make sure that the 
searches are working,”159 perhaps by using a sampling method, as 
suggested below.  The needs of the litigation at issue should dictate what 
technology gets used, and how, in order to strike the optimal balance 
possible between recall and precision.160  The key to defensibility is that 
litigants deploy these search strategies as part of a reasonable, good-faith, 
well-documented discovery protocol.  Lawyers must understand where the 
search technology fits into that protocol and have confidence that they 
have taken measures to ensure the quality of their searches. 
 
C. SAMPLING 
 
1. USE OF “SAMPLING” IN DISCOVERY TODAY 
 
[69] Litigants have increasingly turned to “sampling” methodologies “to 
narrow the burden of searching voluminous electronic data for relevant 
information.”161  Sampling typically involves analyzing a small subset, or 
sample, of a large amount of ESI, to assess the extent to which relevant 
documents likely would be found within the remainder of the data.  Like 
concept and keyword searching, sampling is a method to help identify 
what relevant data may reside in a given population, thereby reducing the 
potential costs of ESI discovery.  Unlike search technologies, however, the 
goal of sampling is not solely to find potentially relevant data in a way that 
lives up to performance measurement standards, but rather to make a 
qualitative judgment as to whether it is worthwhile to conduct further 
searches of stored electronic data.162  “By reviewing an appropriate sample 
of a large body of electronic information, litigants can often determine the 
                                                 
158 Id. 
159 Jason Krause, Preventing E-Glitches: Understanding Search-Term Basics Ensures 
More Thorough E-Discovery Compliance, 92 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (April, 2006).  
160 Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group 
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006); Telephone Interview with Discovery 
Vendor (Nov. 27, 2006). 
161THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, cmt. 11.b. 
162 See, e.g., McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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likelihood that a more comprehensive review of the materials will yield 
useful information.”163 
 
[70] Sampling methodologies increasingly have been accepted by courts 
as an appropriate component of a strategy for determining the scope of 
potentially relevant ESI in computer network backup tapes.164  Sampling 
can greatly reduce discovery costs by determining which backup tapes are 
likely to contain relevant documents, thereby potentially eliminating the 
costly process of restoring large numbers of tapes and reviewing massive 
amounts of data.  Sampling further provides parties with an assessment of 
the costs required to restore and review ESI.  Armed with that knowledge, 
courts can make a judgment first as to whether further discovery is 
warranted, and second, as to which party should bear the costs of 
restoration, review, and production.165  Accordingly, the growing trend is 
for courts to use sampling methodologies to inform cost-shifting analysis 
in discovery.166   
 
2. NOT JUST FOR BACKUP TAPES:  EXPANDING THE USE OF SAMPLING 
 
[71] The judicial endorsement of sampling in discovery recognizes that the 
law should not require parties to spend inordinate sums of money to 
locate, process, and review massive amounts of hard-to-reach data with no 
assurance that any meaningful portion of that data is relevant to the 
                                                 
163 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, comment 11.b.  See, e.g., McPeek, 212 F.R.D. 
at 35 (declining to order additional searches of backup tapes where a “test run” using the 
sampling method indicated it was unlikely that additional backup tapes contained 
relevant data); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(determining the utility of processing archived material after employing a sampling 
method using keyword terms). 
164 See, e.g., Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hopson v. 
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 245 (D. Md. 2005). 
165 See, e.g., Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 574-77 (ordering that requesting party should bear 
25%, and producing party 75%, of the costs associated with restoring, searching, and 
managing data on backup tapes after the sampling method revealed costs associated with 
restoring backup tapes and pertinent documents contained thereon); Zubulake IV, 217 
F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Requiring the responding party to restore and produce 
responsive documents from a small sample of backup tapes will inform the cost-shifting 
analysis”). 
166 See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 601-
03 (E.D. Wis. 2004).  See infra Section IV. 
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lawsuit.  Yet most of the case law approving sampling arises in the context 
of determining whether, and at which party’s cost, backup tapes should be 
searched for relevant ESI.167  That limitation fails to appreciate that 
sampling is not just for backup tapes—it can and should play a role in a 
number of the stages of discovery:168   
 
[72] Document Preservation:  Sampling can be used to assist litigants in 
defining the scope of their document preservation obligation.  Sedona 
Principle 11 explicitly endorses the use of data sampling as a reasonable 
method by which a litigant may satisfy its good faith obligation to 
preserve potentially relevant documents.169  The comments to Principle 11 
explain how, for example, sampling may “reveal substantial redundancy 
between sources (i.e., duplicate data is found in both locations) such that it 
is reasonable for the organization to preserve and produce data from only 
one of the sources.”170  Understanding whether relevant data resides on 
voluminous, stored electronic data promotes cost-efficient, intelligent 
decision-making.  This serves the mandates of both FRCP 1 and the new 
FRCP Amendments. 
 
[73] Framing Document Production:  Sampling also has potential as a 
powerful negotiating tool for parties that disagree about the scope of a 
reasonable discovery search or even regarding the scope of production.171  
Rather than search through entire catalogues of extensive ESI for all 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., McPeek, 212 F.R.D. at 37; Delta Fin. Corp. v. KPMG LLP, 819 N.Y.S.2d 
908, 917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
168 See Herbert L. Roitblat, Electronic Discovery Pragmatics Under the New Rules, 5 
(2006) (on file with authors). 
169 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, princ. 11. 
170 Id. at cmt. 11.a.  See also Hussey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. Civ. A. 02-7099, 
2004 WL 220845, *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2004) (holding that it was unnecessary to search 
an electronic email archive when an identical paper archive had already been searched). 
171 See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 04-1245-MLB-DWB, 2006 WL 3913444, 
at *11 n.21 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006) (noting that in a dispute over a search of email on 
backup tapes, the parties could have agreed to run a search of a small sample of e-mails 
to assist the parties and the court in determining the likelihood that additional searches 
would disclose important relevant information); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, No. 05-
1203-WEB, 2006 WL 1174040 *6, (D. Kan. May 1, 2006) (ordering parties to confer on 
whether sampling of electronic database would suffice as method to discern the relevancy 
of data contained therein). 
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relevant data, a producing party could offer a sample of its collection and 
place the burden on the requesting party to show good cause for further 
production.172  For example, a party could agree to produce relevant data 
from a few key custodians as an initial sample, on the basis that any 
subsequent discovery requests issued would be anchored to what was 
learned from the initial production.  In this vein, sampling could “short-
circuit the use of broad requests, multiple rounds of discovery, or multiple 
depositions that would otherwise be needed to identify the truly responsive 
documents.”173  These uses of sampling would help to ensure that 
reasonably complete responses are provided to discovery requests while 
reducing the burden and expense of discovery.174 
 
[74] Quality Assurance:  Sampling also may be used to “test the 
effectiveness of the selection strategies used to identify documents to be 
reviewed.”175  For example, a litigant could sample a portion of a 
collection of electronic documents, review those documents for relevance, 
then run its keyword or concept search in the same sample to compare the 
results.  Such a measure, taken proactively, could go a long way in both 
demonstrating the legitimacy of the search technology employed and 
showing that the party is using a good-faith, reasonable approach to 
discovery protocols in general. 
 
[75] In whatever discovery context sampling is employed, it is important 
that litigants use it with diligence and document the protocols used.  This 
will help to defend against any future claims that the sampling was 
specifically tailored to skew the results.176 
 
                                                 
172 Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 682 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting a motion to 
compel production of a sample of electronic data to one requesting party to assess 
relevance to the issues of the case). 
173 Roitblat, supra note 168, at 5. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 See Quinby v. WestLB AG, 04 Civ. 7406, 2006 WL 2597900, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 5, 2006) (noting an argument that a party sample was inherently flawed where the 
period of sampling was not representative of timeframes covered by the requested 
document production). 
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3. A “HYBRID” APPROACH:  BLENDING SAMPLING WITH SEARCH 
TECHNOLOGY TO MAXIMIZE EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY 
 
[76] The decision of whether to use keywords, concepts, or sampling in a 
given litigation should not be approached from a “one size fits all” 
perspective.  “[T]here is nothing to prevent combining one or more . . . 
techniques in hybrid fashion to optimize search results”177 during both 
document preservation and review.  As two observers put it: 
 
With large text-based data compilations, word and concept 
searches are well-accepted methods for locating and 
retrieving responsive data.  To narrow large collections of 
backup media, sampling is likewise a well-accepted 
methodology.  Technology is rapidly developing in this 
area, and promises to give parties better tools to reduce the 
scope of searches, reducing costs and burdens all around.178 
[77] Accordingly, courts and litigants are beginning to fashion discovery 
search protocols for attorney review and production that incorporate both 
sampling and search technology.179  For example, due to the enormous 
costs often associated with data restoration and attorney review, a 
company can restore a sample of ESI and then use keyword searching to 
determine what measure of relevant data that sample contains.180  The 
company can then extrapolate from that the potential responsiveness of the 
ESI, as well as how much it would cost an attorney to review the culled-
down dataset.181 
 
[78] A combination of sampling and keyword/concept searching also 
could be used to validate proposed keywords or concepts to be used in 
culling down a large collection to a smaller set to be reviewed by 
attorneys.  For example, a producing party could apply a certain set of 
                                                 
177 Baron, supra note 111, at 5. 
178 Carroll, supra note 102, at 8.  
179 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(using a keyword list to locate relevant documents in a sampling of backup tapes). 
180 See id. 
181 See id; see also Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 
603 (E.D. Wis. 2004). 
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keywords and/or concepts to cull down a sample of the collection and then 
analyze the results.  To the extent the results show that the use of those 
keywords and concepts did not except a large volume of relevant 
information from the attorney review process, that validates and supports 
the use of those keywords and concepts to cull down the remainder of the 
collection.   
 
[79] Likewise, in the preservation context, companies that have certain 
technological capabilities can make innovative use of keyword searches, 
concept searches, and sampling as part of the “reasonable steps” taken to 
ensure that potentially responsive ESI is located and preserved.182  Again, 
the key to reasonableness and defensibility is not necessarily the type of 
search technology used, but rather the development of a well thought-out, 
comprehensive search protocol that is applied consistently by the lawyers 
and companies involved.183 
 
[80] The precise combination of methodologies used for a given litigation 
will depend upon the nature of the case and the data systems of the 
particular company or companies involved.  As Sedona Principle 6 
recognizes, it is the producing party who is “best situated to evaluate the 
procedures, methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving 
and producing their own electronic data and documents.”184  Accordingly, 
producing parties should strike a balance between a good-faith, 
cooperative spirit on the one hand, and efforts to avoid allowing the 
opposing party to dictate the precise methods by which it locates relevant 
documents on the other.185   
 
[81] Litigants should educate themselves and courts alike with respect to 
the potential efficiencies to be gained by employing advanced search 
strategies in all areas of discovery.  Search technologies, while in their 
infancy, are rapidly growing ever more robust.  It is to be expected that the 
courts will be playing “catch-up” for some time to come.  Increasingly, 
however, “judges, even those raised before the dawn of the modern 
                                                 
182 See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
183 See id. 
184 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, princ. 6. 
185 Carroll, supra note 102, at 3. 
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computer era, are becoming comfortable with the technology and size of 
electronic discovery.”186  Both parties and courts should continue to 
encourage and promote the use of search and sampling technologies in a 
variety of stages of the discovery process.187 
 
D. STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSIBILITY OF USING SEARCH AND 
SAMPLING METHODOLOGIES IN DISCOVERY 
 
1. ACT EARLY, ACT COOPERATIVELY 
 
[82] As early as possible, a producing party should consider engaging the 
requesting party in discussions regarding specific search and sampling 
methodologies to be used in the discovery of ESI. 188  In addition to the 
fact that the FRCP Amendments encourage early discussions of this 
nature,189 proactively suggesting search and sampling protocols places the 
                                                 
186 Steven C. Bennett & Thomas N. Niccum, Two Views from the Data Mountain, 36 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 607, 619 (2003). See, e.g.,  Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale, No. 03 Civ. 0257, 2004 WL 764895 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2004). 
187 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, cmt. 11.a. 
188 Commentators encourage collaborating about search selection criteria with opposing 
counsel during early “meet and confer” conferences.  See, e.g., Gregory P. Joseph & 
Barry F. McNeil, Electronic Discovery Standards – Draft Amendments to Civil Discovery 
Standards, A.B.A. SECT. LITG.  8 (2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/document.pdf (noting that during 
early discovery conferences, “parties should consider stipulating to . . . the use of 
specified key terms or other selection criteria to search some or all of the potentially 
responsive data for discoverable information.”).  Moreover, the FRCP Amendments 
increase the odds that counsel will be able to settle on detailed search methodologies in 
the early onset of litigation in light of the need for counsel to become familiar with their 
clients’ computer systems and ESI for the 26(f) conference, and develop strategies 
accordingly.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) comm. n (“When a case involves discovery of 
[ESI], the issues to be addressed during the Rule 26(f) conference depend on the nature 
and extent of the contemplated discovery and of the parties’ information systems.  It may 
be important for the parties to discuss those systems, and accordingly important for 
counsel to become familiar with those systems before the conference”).  
189 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3) (requiring the parties to “meet and confer” to discuss any 
issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(f) comm. n (discussing a variety of issues regarding ESI that deserve attention 
during the discovery planning stage, including identification “of the various sources of 
[topics relating to discovery] within a party’s control that should be searched for ESI,” 
and the discussion of “any issues regarding preservation . . . particularly . . . with regard 
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producing party in a favorable position should future disputes arise 
regarding ESI.190  Simply creating an opportunity for the requesting party 
to have input on those matters enhances the producing party’s own 
credibility in those disputes.  The more the requesting party rebuffs 
attempts at bilateral discussions, the less credibility it will have in making 
future objections to the court about the search process ultimately 
selected.191  Parties “who appear to stonewall or fail to make complete 
responses to discovery requests do so at their peril.  The courts can and do 
penalize recalcitrant parties.”192 
 
[83] As standards for using particular software products employing one or 
more search methodologies becomes streamlined, opposing parties in 
litigation will “theoretically be more likely to reach agreement . . . 
concerning the use of those products for conducting wide-scale searches of 
e-records.”193  Moreover, if the FRCP Amendments are any indication, 
courts may expect the parties to agree upon streamlined electronic 
discovery protocols during early meet-and-confer sessions.  After all, one 
of the driving principles behind the FRCP Amendments was the need to 
expedite discovery and reduce the costs of litigation.194 
                                                                                                                         
to ESI.  The volume and dynamic nature of ESI may complicate preservation obligations 
. . . .  The parties should pay particular attention to the balance between the competing 
needs to preserve relevant evidence and to continue routine operations critical to ongoing 
activities”). 
190 See, e.g., Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374-75  (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(implementing a search protocol formulated by a producing party and noting that the 
requesting party’s refusal to cooperate would have justified the producing party’s 
unilateral search, review, and production of electronic data where requesting party 
refused to stipulate to a search strategy for electronic documents).   
191 See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int’l v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002 WL 
818061, at *6-7 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002) (ordering extensive discovery in the fashion 
suggested by the requesting party in light of the producing party’s earlier failures to 
cooperate).  
192 Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital Era:  Considerations 
for Corporate Counsel, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, 11 (2003);  see, e.g., 
Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885 (Fl. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (entering default judgment against producing party for host of 
discovery abuses, including repeated unjustified refusals to agree to discovery search 
protocols). 
193 Baron, supra note 111, at 244. 
194 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) comm. n. 
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[84] The Rules contemplate that a party should be prepared, early in the 
discovery process, to discuss proposed protocols for streamlining ESI 
discovery, including search and sampling methodologies and the format 
for production.195  As one court recently stated:   
 
[A]s the [FRCP Amendments] make clear, counsel have a 
duty to take the initiative in meeting and conferring to plan 
for appropriate discovery of electronically stored 
information at the commencement of any case in which 
electronic records will be sought . . . .  At a minimum, they 
should discuss . . . the burdens and expenses that the 
producing party will face . . . and how they may be reduced 
(i.e. . . . using sampling to search, rather than searching all 
records).196 
 
[85] The same court noted that “[t]he days when the requesting party can 
expect to ‘get it all’ and the producing party to produce whatever they feel 
like producing are long gone.”197  Where a defendant has an immense 
volume of electronic records and the plaintiff relatively few, “it is 
incumbent upon the plaintiff to have reasonable expectations as to what 
should be produced by the defendant” in recognition of the fact that, in 
such cases, ESI discovery “is not played on a level field.”198 
 
[86] In view of advancing the efficiency directives of FRCP 1, parties 
should take care to discuss, in detail, search and sampling protocols 
relating to ESI in meet-and-confer conferences following the issuance of 
document requests.  To the extent that the parties cannot agree on those 
protocols, responding parties should not unduly hesitate in asking courts to 
endorse them in furtherance of the spirit and mandate of FRCP 1.  Raising 
and resolving these issues at the front-end of discovery not only reduces 
the costs of managing relevant data, but it also may serve to diffuse 
potential discovery disputes further down the road, thereby advancing the 
                                                 
195 Id. See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 245 (D. 
Md. 2005). 
196 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 245. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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directive of FRCP 1 to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”199 
 
2. DO NOT WAIT UNTIL THE MOTION TO COMPEL:  TAKE EARLY, 
AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO SECURE THE COURT’S ENDORSEMENT OF SEARCH 
AND SAMPLING STRATEGIES 
 
[87] Any seasoned litigator knows that discovery negotiations do not take 
place in Shangri-La.  It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where, despite 
numerous meet-and-confer sessions, the parties cannot arrive at an agreed-
upon protocol for the use of search and sampling methodologies for the 
discovery of ESI.  While parties can always enter into court-endorsed 
stipulations regarding electronic discovery protocols after the Rule 26(f) 
and Rule 16(b) timeframe,200 parties often wait until they are in a motion 
to compel context before they get the court involved.  There is no reason 
to so delay court participation, especially now in light of the recent FRCP 
Amendments.  Absent agreement from the opposing party, parties should 
start acting affirmatively to secure court approval of reasonable discovery 
protocols, including search strategies involving sampling, keyword, and/or 
concept search methodologies. 201   
 
[88] For example, a party can move for a protective order202 outlining 
specific terms and conditions under which discovery of electronic 
information may be had.  New Rule 26(b)(2)(B) explicitly provides that a 
party from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order 
from discovery of ESI from sources that it identifies as “not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”203  Even where ESI is 
“accessible,” but nonetheless costly to search, review, and produce, a party 
may always move for a protective order under the proportionality rule, 
now found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).204  The proportionality rule recognizes 
                                                 
199 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
200 See, e.g., Palgut v. City of Colo. Springs, No. CIVA 06CV01142 WDMMJ, 2006 WL 
3483442, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 29, 2006) (discussing a stipulation and order regarding 
electronic discovery plan and order to preserve evidence). 
201 See Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
202 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).   
203 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
204 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c). 
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that discovery should be limited where the court determines that burden or 
expense of discovery outweighs its likely benefit.205  A motion for 
protective order should detail the proposed search procedures, explain why 
attempts to secure agreement from the opposing party failed, provide 
specifics as to the costs and burdens associated with the proposal, and 
otherwise explain good cause for the terms proposed. 
 
[89] As discussed in section IV.C, infra, the proportionality rule set forth 
in 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) also allows a court to deny altogether an aspect of 
discovery where the burdens of the discovery outweigh its benefits.206 
Obtaining the court’s outright denial of a form or scope of discovery 
requested by the opposing party may in some cases be the most 
appropriate way to achieve the “just, speedy, and “inexpensive” resolution 
mandated by FRCP 1. 
 
E. ATTAINING “DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT” 207 WITH AN EFFECTIVE DATA 
LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT POLICY 
 
[90] Perhaps the most effective measure a company can take to cut 
discovery costs has nothing directly to do with discovery, but with the 
general day-to-day management of its data lifecycle.  As discussed above, 
modern technologies have done much to facilitate business, but “these 
same technologies have the capacity to create a nightmarish amount of 
potentially discoverable material.” 208  In-house counsel can save a 
company a lot of money (and headaches) by developing and implementing 
a robust data lifecycle management policy/program that provides 
guidelines and requirements for the creation, dissemination, storage, 
archival, and disposal of the company’s ESI.  “Such policies and 
procedures, if followed, reduce the amount of stored electronic 
information and streamline the production process in the event of 
litigation.”209 
 
                                                 
205 Id.  
206 See infra section IV.C.4. 
207 Ashby Jones, What a Mess!, NAT’L L. J., Dec. 2, 2002, at C6. 
208 Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 15. 
209 Id. at 13.   
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[91] The FRCP Amendments have generated some panic and confusion 
among companies, and their in-house counsel, about what changes 
companies are now required to make with respect to data lifecycle 
management.  Will companies now need to retain, in perpetuity, all e-
mails and other ESI generated by their employees (as one news report 
incorrectly implied the day the new Rules went into effect)?210  The 
answer, assuredly, is “no.”  Of course, and as discussed above, as soon as 
a company reasonably anticipates litigation it must institute a “litigation 
hold” against any aspect of its data lifecycle management program that 
would result in the spoliation of potentially relevant ESI.211  The 
Amendments do not change that obligation.  But there is no Rule 
(Amended or otherwise) that dictates how companies must manage data 
outside of litigation.   
 
[92] Though the Rules do not require a company to implement a data 
lifecycle management program, it is fair to say that the Amendments 
(particularly new Rule 37(f)) make it even more beneficial for a company 
to do so.  Today companies “sit atop volcanoes of bits and bytes.”212  
Companies use and retain ESI in a variety of different forms, and in a 
multiplicity of locations, including servers, backup tapes, desktops, 
laptops, PDAs, home computers, and so forth, many of which are often 
hard to reach.213  Data storage is relatively inexpensive, so it often “just 
piles up,” turning “corporate headquarters into technology silos.” 214  Such 
hodgepodge document management is increasingly less workable in light 
of the modern liabilities associated with the discovery of electronic 
information.  When ESI is managed poorly, it can end up later costing a 
company millions of dollars in excess discovery costs when litigation hits. 
 
                                                 
210 See, e.g., Careful: Employee E-Mails, IMs Must Be Tracked, Dec. 1, 2006, 
http://listserv.educause.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind06&L=smallcol&D=1&P=38497 (last 
visited March 19, 2007) ( warning falsely, that “U.S. companies will need to keep track of 
all of the e-mails, instant messages and other electronic documents generated by their 
employees thanks to [the amended FRCP that took effect December 1, 2006”]). 
211 See supra notes 83 & 85 and accompanying text. 
212 Jones, supra note 207.  
213 Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84. 
214 Jones, supra note 207. 
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[93] First, the lack of an effective data lifecycle management program 
makes the task of finding and preserving data potentially relevant to a 
specific litigation like finding a needle in a haystack.  Many of the high 
costs associated with discovery arise in part because electronic data stored 
for one purpose is suddenly required to be preserved, collected, and 
processed for another purpose, and the company infrastructure is not able 
to shift gears accordingly.215  Simply put, “the larger the number of 
records stored, the slower and more rigorous the search for them will be.” 
216  Thus, companies end up spending a great deal of money simply to 
locate their own stored information, often without any guarantee of 
reasonable success. 217  Moreover, even when companies do have data 
lifecycle management policies, such as data retention schedules, a lack of 
oversight and enforcement in making sure employees carry out those 
policies can result in the “expenditure of considerable time and money in 
discovery disputes over the production of e-mails that should have been 
destroyed in the first place.”  218 
 
[94] Second, plaintiffs’ lawyers are increasingly taking advantage of the 
apparent mismanagement or non-management of ESI to cause litigation to 
degenerate into a collateral proceeding about information that the 
company allegedly has allowed to be spoliated and what kind of “adverse 
inference” or other sanction is an appropriate punishment for that 
                                                 
215 Isom, supra note 36, at 11. 
216 Marilee S. Chan, Paper Piles to Computer Files: A Federal Approach to Electronic 
Records Retention and Management, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 809 (2004). 
217 Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 3. 
218 Id.  For example, in Tulip Computers, defendant Dell belatedly identified the existence 
of a massive amount of potentially responsive data nine months after being served with 
discovery requests.  Dell admitted that it had mistakenly destroyed documents as well. 
Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp.. No. CIV.A. 00-981-RRM, 2002 WL 
818061, at *4 (D. Del. April 30, 2002). In granting the plaintiff extensive additional 
discovery that allowed it “to ascertain for themselves whether Dell’s representations that 
all responsive documents have been produced are accurate,” noting Dell’s failure 
“indicates either a failure to take its discovery obligations with the required degree of 
seriousness and diligence or an extreme lack of knowledge and control over its own files 
and procedures.” Id. at *6-7; see also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 
Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (stating that expensive 
and time-consuming discovery dispute over e-mails “would be moot” if producing party 
had followed its e-mail retention policy). 
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spoliation.219  In the context of sanctions for the spoliation of relevant 
documents, a company’s ignorance about the way computer systems retain 
and dispose of ESI is not a defense.  The seminal Zubulake decisions put 
an end to any doubts about that.220  Irrespective of the state of a 
company’s management of records, once it “reasonably anticipates 
litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction 
policy and place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant 
documents.”221  This duty requires “a party and her counsel [to] make 
certain that all sources of potentially relevant information are identified 
and placed ‘on hold.’  To do this, counsel must become fully familiar with 
her client’s document retention policies, as well as the client’s data 
retention architecture.”222 
 
[95] A key problem with this standard, for many companies, is that they 
often have no coherent data retention policy to begin with—in essence, 
they do not have their ESI “house” in order.  In a 2006 survey published 
by E-Discovery Advisor Magazine, 50% of corporate attorneys responded 
that they are either not confident in their company’s document retention 
program or their company doesn’t have any program/policy.223  
Compounding the problem, many in-house lawyers “are very 
uncomfortable with the technical side” of data management.224 
 
[96] It is vital that corporate America begin to regain control of its 
electronic data.225  The best measure companies can take to avoid being 
trampled underfoot by both mounting discovery costs and the increasing 
risk of sanctions for spoliation of relevant evidence is to develop and 
implement an effective data lifecycle management program that addresses 
the systemic storage and disposal of electronic data.  While a detailed 
discussion of the elements of data lifecycle management are beyond the 
                                                 
219 Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84, at 19.   
220 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
221 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (emphasis added). 
222 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432. 
223 Are Companies Prepared for the New Federal Rules on E-Discovery?, E-DISCOVERY 
ADVISOR MAG., Web Ed. 2006, Week 48, http://e-discoveryadvisor.com/doc/18626. 
224 Jones, supra note 207, at C7.  
225 Id. at C6. 
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scope of this article,226 the development and implementation of a 
successful program will require participation from multiple departments 
within a company, including legal, IT, and senior management. “All who 
are involved in the creation, storage, and destruction of documents should 
follow the policy, and the company should create an enforcement 
mechanism.”227  It is therefore important for companies to take affirmative 
steps to confirm that their policies are understood and followed by 
employees at all levels. 228 IN the end,  a program can keep ESI volume 
and proliferation to a minimum so that there is less data sitting around, and 
in fewer locations, when litigation hits, thus serving as the first line of 
defense against the increasing costs associated with ESI discovery. 
 
IV. COST-SHIFTING IN DISCOVERY:  WINNING THE BATTLE THAT MAY WIN 
THE WAR 
 
[97] A long-standing federal presumption, articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, holds that that the party 
responding to a discovery requests pays all related production expenses.229  
Modern courts, however, have shown an increased willingness to issue 
cost-shifting orders to reduce the burden of discovery for parties that 
otherwise would be saddled with huge discovery costs given the scope of 
the discovery requests and/or the inaccessibility of the potentially relevant 
ESI.  This trend recognizes that a party should not be able to strategically 
                                                 
226 See Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 13 (discussing and listing the considerations 
corporate counsel should take into account when developing a document retention policy) 
227 Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 13.   
228 Jones, supra note 207, at C7 (“[I]t takes just one provocative e-mail to create a public-
relations disaster or a litigation liability.”). See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 439-40 
(discussing the liabilities caused when employees disregard company directives in an 
atmosphere where the directives are not properly monitored and enforced by the 
company). 
229 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (holding under 
discovery rules that “the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense 
of complying with discovery requests”); Toshiba Am. Electronic Components, Inc. v. 
Super. Ct., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532. 538 (2004) (“The general rule in both state and federal 
court is that the responding party bears the expense typically involved in responding to 
discovery requests, such as the expense of producing documents.”). 
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abuse the Oppenheimer presumption by issuing broad discovery requests 
to drive up opponents’ litigation costs and force settlements.230 
 
[98] Cost-shifting battles are hotly contested and for good reason:  
decisions on motions regarding who will be required to pay for discovery 
responses (the cost of which may run into the hundreds of thousands, if 
not tens of millions, of dollars) can impact severely how an action 
proceeds and in fact may be outcome-determinative in some cases.231  This 
section examines the evolution of the law of cost-shifting both in federal 
and state court and as relevant in the recent FRCP Amendments.  It then 
explores the arguments in favor of shifting other ESI discovery costs that 
have not historically been the subject of cost-shifting discussions.  Finally, 
this section sets out several issues practitioners should consider when 
making the move to shift all or some of their clients’ discovery costs.   
 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF COST-SHIFTING 
 
[99] “Early” cases addressing cost allocation of ESI discovery required the 
responding party to bear the cost of producing ESI, reasoning that having 
to produce the data in litigation was an ordinary and foreseeable risk of 
using electronic storage media.232  Despite an increasing number of high-
                                                 
230 Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their 
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2204 (1989).   
231 See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)  
Courts must remember that cost-shifting may effectively end discovery, 
especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large 
corporations.  As large companies increasingly move to entirely paper-
free environments, the frequent use of cost-shifting will have the effect 
of crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases.  This will 
both undermine the ‘strong public policy favor[ing] resolving disputes 
on their merits,’ and may ultimately deter the filing of potentially 
meritorious claims. 
Id. (quoting Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com, Inc., 249 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2001)); 
Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, No. 01 CVS 10614, 2006 WL 3287382, *5 (N.C. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (“It is indisputable that the decisions concerning the costs of e-
discovery in some cases could be outcome-determinative.”). 
232 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 WL 376682 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 15, 1995) (denying a motion that requesting party 
bear the cost of producing electronic documents: “if a party chooses an electronic storage 
method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable 
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profile cases and the recent FRCP Amendments turning the tide, the law 
on shifting the cost of producing ESI remains jurisdiction-specific, often 
unsettled, sometimes conflicting, and continually evolving.  While cost-
shifting principles emerging in federal court can provide some guidance 
for resolving ESI discovery disputes in state courts, state-specific statutes 
and case law can vary greatly from federal standards.  Counsel for a party 
wishing to effectively pursue the shifting of costs associated with ESI 
discovery, therefore, should gain an understanding of the emerging 
standards and recent judicial decisions in the relevant jurisdictions. 
 
1. FEDERAL LAW 
 
[100] The majority of ink that has been devoted to discussing the trials and 
tribulations of ESI discovery (not to mention the seminars, forums, 
working groups, rules, guidelines, and opinions) focuses on federal courts 
and the FRCP.  Existing federal case law on the topic of cost-shifting deals 
almost exclusively with the burden and expense of producing data stored 
on back-up tapes. 233 Interestingly, the Rules do not expressly contemplate 
                                                                                                                         
risk”); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (denying a motion 
to shift costs of discovery of electronic data because: (1) the defendant was in the “most 
economical position to call up its own computer stored data,” (2) cost was not excessive, 
(3) relative burden in obtaining the data was substantially greater to requesting party, and 
(4) responding party was benefited to some degree); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-
2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Mass. June 16, 1999) (stating that the cost of 
restoring electronic data in response to discovery request is “one of the risks taken on by 
companies which have made the decision to avail themselves of the computer 
technology”). 
233 See, e.g., Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04CIV.7406 (WHP) (HBP), 2006 WL 2597900, 
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) (shifting 30% of costs of restoring and searching e-mails 
of former employees from back-up tapes); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 
568, 574-77 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (shifting part of the costs  associated with restoring, 
searching, and managing data on backup tapes to requesting party); Hagemeyer N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 603 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (ordering 
defendant to restore a sample of backup tapes and parties to make additional submissions 
addressing whether burden or expense of satisfying entire request is proportionate to 
likely benefit); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003) (requiring defendant to bear part of costs of producing approximately 996 
network backup tapes, containing, among other things, plaintiff's email); Zubulake I, 217 
F.R.D. at 322 (articulating seven factor cost-shifting analysis for determining who should 
pay the cost of producing material from “inaccessible” media, like backup tapes); Rowe 
Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
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cost-shifting.  Rather, in federal court, discovery cost-shifting has 
historically been done pursuant to a district court’s discretion under Rule 
26(c) “to grant orders protecting [respondents] from ‘undue burden or 
expense,’” which has been interpreted to include orders for the requesting 
party’s payment of the costs of discovery.234  
 
[101] Rule 26(c) protective orders are especially important in the context 
of ESI discovery, where the costs of production can cripple responding 
parties and force them to settle cases prematurely.  There is a growing 
body of federal case law addressing cost-shifting when ESI is inaccessible, 
such as data that resides on back-up tapes.  Most notable are the watershed 
Zubulake decisions, which are widely regarded as the most thorough 
treatment of cost-shifting under federal law.  In light of the Amendments 
addressing cost-shifting considerations under the FRCP, however, the 
validity of pre-Amendment case law is unclear.  Given that Zubulake’s 
Judge Scheindlin sat on the committee to amend the Rules, the cases and 
its progeny still may be valuable tools for interpreting the meaning and 
scope of the Amended Rules. 
 
(A) ZUBULAKE’S APPROACH 
 
[102] In the oft-cited decisions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, which are 
six in number, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York 
created the cost-shifting test for discovery that has been widely used by 
the federal courts.235   
                                                                                                                         
(recognizing the difficulties created when litigants must comply with discovery requests 
seeking data contained on backup tapes); McPeek v. Ashcroft,, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 
(D.D.C. 2001) (“The more likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is 
relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the [responding party] search at its own 
expense”). 
234 Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 358.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 34, advisory comm. 
notes to 1970 Amendments (“[T]he Courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect 
respondent against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring 
that the discovering party pay costs.”).   
235 See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D.309; Zubulake II, 230 F.R.D. 290 (2003); Zubulake III, 216 
F.R.D. 280 (2003); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (2003); Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422 
(2004); Zubulake VI, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (2005).  Because the new test required the 
producing party to investigate certain issues and report back to the court, Judge 
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[103] The plaintiff in Zubulake contended that “key evidence is located in 
various e-mails exchanged among UBS employees that now exist only on 
backup tapes and perhaps other archived media.”236  UBS argued that it 
had produced all responsive documents, although admittedly it had never 
searched for responsive emails on any of its backup tapes.237  The court 
promptly rejected UBS’s argument, finding the facts “strongly” suggested 
that the backup tapes contained responsive emails necessary to Zubulake’s 
case.238  The court then turned to the issue of cost-shifting.  UBS urged 
that, due to the immense cost of restoring and searching the backup tapes, 
it should not bear the undue burden or expense of producing e-mails from 
them.FN  In evaluating whether to diverge from the presumption that the 
responding party pays for discovery costs, the court adopted the following 
three-step approach. 
 
(I) STEP ONE:  DETERMINE ACCESSIBILITY OF DATA 
 
[104] Zubulake instructed that the “first question . . . is whether cost-
shifting must be considered” at all.239  The court rejected the proposition 
that shifting should be considered in all ESI cases, citing both the 
Oppenheimer presumption and the fact that today “virtually all cases” 
involve ESI.240  Rather, the court held that “cost-shifting should only be 
considered when electronic discovery imposes an ‘undue burden or 
expense’ on the responding party.”241  “[W]hether production of 
documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether 
it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format (a distinction that 
corresponds closely to the expense of production).”242 
 
                                                                                                                         
Scheindlin did not apply it fully to the facts of her case until Zubulake III.  For cases 
adopting Zubulake’s approach, see infra n.252. 
236 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311-12. 
237 Id. at 317. 
238 Id. 
FN Id.  
239 Id.  
240 Id.   
241 Id. at 318. 
242 Id. 
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[105] The court then offered the following hierarchy of the accessibility of 
ESI, from most accessible to least accessible: 
 
• Active, online data (data used in the very active states of its 
life, such as when it is being created or received or 
processed, e.g., hard drives); 
• Online data (data stored in a robotic storage device that 
uses multiple read/write devices to store and retrieve 
records, e.g. optical disks); 
• Offline storage/archives (data stored on removal optical 
disks or magnetic tape media that can be labeled and stored 
on a shelf or rack); 
• Backup tapes (data stored on tape drives that are not 
organized for retrieval); 
• Erased, fragmented or damaged data (data never meant to 
be retrieved that can only be accessed after significant 
processing).243 
 
[106] Of these categories, the court held the first three were considered 
accessible and the last two were considered inaccessible.244  This portion 
of the Zubulake test is particularly important because it is the gateway to 
the cost-shifting analysis.  If the requested discovery comes from the first 
three categories, the Oppenheimer presumption controls.  If the discovery 
comes from the latter two categories, a cost-shifting analysis ensues. 
 
(II) STEP TWO:  TEST-RUN SAMPLE DATA 
 
[107] The second step instructs that the producing party should test a 
sample of the data to estimate the cost and likelihood that the requested 
discovery will be responsive.  The court held that the results of that test 
would be used to determine whether to shift costs.245 
 
 
 
                                                 
243 Id. at 318-19.   
244 Id. at 319-20. 
245 Id. at 323-24.   
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(III) STEP THREE:  APPLY THE SEVEN-FACTOR TEST 
 
[108] Armed with the information learned in the test-run, the third and 
final step involves analyzing whether cost-shifting is appropriate.246  
Emphasizing the requirements of Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) (now Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii)), the court offered its own seven-factor test, listed from 
most to least important: 
 
(1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to 
discover relevant information;  
(2) the availability of such information from other sources; 
(3) the total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy;  
(4) the total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party;  
(5) the relative ability of each party to control costs and its 
incentive to do so;  
(6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and  
(7) the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information.247 
[109] The court applied its seven-factor test to the sampling results and 
found that factors 1-4 cut against cost-shifting, factors 5-6 were neutral, 
and factor 7 favored cost shifting.248  Although these findings would 
appear to weigh against cost-shifting, the court held that because 
continued production may produce valuable information, “some cost 
shifting is appropriate.”249  The court explained that “the precise allocation 
is a matter of judgment and fairness rather than a mathematical 
                                                 
246 Id. at 324. 
247 Id. at 321-23. 
248 See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
249 Id. 
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consequence of the seven factors . . . .”250  The court shifted 25% of the 
cost to the plaintiff and assigned the other 75% to the defendant.251   
 
[110] The primary point of the Zubulake decision is that a district court 
judge has broad discretion in deciding cost-shifting disputes.  
Nevertheless, the Zubulake approach has been applied in several federal 
cases.252 
 
(B) AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
[111] The Amended FRCP provide that parties are expected to produce 
relevant documents and data from locations that are “reasonably 
accessible,” and notify their opponents of locations that are “not 
reasonably accessible” but where it is possible that relevant documents 
may reside.253  “A party need not provide discovery of electronically 
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”254  The Committee Note to 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) suggests that the required identification “should, to the 
extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to 
evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the 
likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.”  It 
                                                 
250 Id.   
251 Id.   
252 See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 04-1245-MLB-DWB, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83363, at *19-35 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006); Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04 Civ. 
7406, 2006 WL 2597900, at *7, *11-16  (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006); Xpedior Credit Trust 
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp.2d 459, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Multitech. Servs., L.P. v. Verizon, No. Civ. A 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. 
Tex. July 12, 2004); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570-73 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (modifying Zubulake test by adding an eighth factor “that considers the 
importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues of the litigation”; 
Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03 (E.D. Wis. 
2004); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476 (N.D. Cal. 2003).   
253 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  Even where a party asserts that potentially relevant 
electronic documents or data reside in a location that is “not reasonably accessible,” that 
party still may be obligated to preserve the data in that location throughout the life of the 
litigation.  FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006) comm. note  
254 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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does not specify when (at what point in the discovery process) that 
identification should take place.255 
 
[112] If an agreement cannot be reached as to whether, or on what terms, 
sources identified as “not reasonably accessible” should be searched and 
discoverable information produced, a requesting party may move to 
compel production or the responding party can move for a protective order 
barring the discovery.256  The court may order production if the 
responding party does not convince the court that the data is “not 
reasonably accessible.”  Even if the responding party does so convince the 
court, the court still may order production where the requesting party 
shows “good cause” for the production, “considering the limitations set 
forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”257  What facts will satisfy a responding party’s 
burden of proving inaccessibility is not spelled out in the Rule.258  The 
Advisory Committee notes to Amended Rule 26(b)(2) provide that, once 
the burden has shifted to the requesting party to show good cause, the 
seven-factor test from Zubulake provides some of the “[a]ppropriate 
considerations” that may be used to determine whether the burdens and 
costs of requiring a responding party to search for and produce ESI that is 
not reasonably accessible can be justified in the circumstances of the 
case.259 
 
[113] If the court orders production, the requesting party may be required 
to pay some or all of the cost of accessing the data and converting it into a 
format that allows the responding party to review and produce it.260  The 
Rules also contemplate that parties discuss, and even experiment with, 
sampling as a means to assess the best way to deal with data that is “not 
reasonably accessible.”261  As of the time of the writing of this article, 
there have been no notable federal decisions construing or interpreting 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) as Amended. 
 
                                                 
255 FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006) comm. n. 
256 Id. 
257 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).   
258 FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006) comm. n. 
259 Id.  
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
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2. STATE COURT 
 
[114] State court judges are seeing disputes regarding the discovery of 
electronic information with increasing frequency.  When those discovery 
issues arise in state court, however, they are often governed by state rules 
and case law that are substantially different from those that guide federal 
courts.  In particular, as is discussed in this section, some states have 
procedural rules governing the allocation of discovery costs that are quite 
different from the federal rules.262  Moreover, while there are numerous 
federal decisions addressing who should bear the burden of costs 
associated with discovery of electronic information, there is comparatively 
little precedent in state courts. 
 
(A) CALIFORNIA 
 
[115] In California, California Code of Civil Procedure section 
2031.280(b) governs whether some or all of the potentially substantial 
costs associated with producing ESI in a usable format should be shifted to 
the requesting party.  It provides that “any documents demanded shall 
either be produced as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, or 
be organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the demand” 
and that, “[i]f necessary, the responding party at the reasonable expense of 
the demanding party shall, through detection devices, translate any data 
compilations included in the demand into reasonably usable form.”263  
This cost-shifting provision therefore puts the burden on the requesting 
party to pay for electronic data translation and compilation as long as the 
cost is reasonable.   
 
                                                 
262 But see Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 05-CVS-5564, 2006 WL 
3093174, at *16 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (discussing North Carolina’s Guidelines 
For State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery Of Electronically-Stored Information 
regarding reallocation of discovery costs reflects three-tiered test and cost-benefit 
analysis from Zubulake and discussing that “[l]ike Zubulake, the Guideline treats cost-
shifting as a matter for the judge’s discretion”).   
263 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2031.280(b).  California courts may also order the use of 
technology, such as CD-ROMs, Internet Web sites, electronic document depositories, 
Internet depositions, videoconferencing, etc., to aid the discovery process in certain cases.  
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 2017.730-740. 
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[116] The question of whether the cost-shifting contemplated by section 
2031.280(b) is mandatory was answered in the affirmative by the 
California Court of Appeal in Toshiba America Electronic Components, 
Inc. v. Superior Court.  In a rare appellate writ proceeding on a discovery 
issue, the California Court of Appeal considered the phrase “at the 
reasonable expense of the demanding party” and whether this cost-shifting 
was “mandatory” or “merely permits the trial court to shift the cost to the 
demanding party when the responding party objects.”264  Defendant 
Toshiba argued that the provision automatically shifted costs for extensive 
data restoration, estimated between $1.5 and $1.9 million.265  Plaintiff 
Lexar Media countered that Zubulake and Rule 26(c)’s “undue burden or 
expense” standard controls.266  While recognizing that “the general rule in 
both state and federal court is that the responding party bears the expense 
typically involved in responding to discovery requests[,]”267 the court 
relied on the controlling California statute to ultimately side with Toshiba, 
holding that the demanding party is expected to pay the reasonable costs 
of necessary electronic data translation pursuant to section 2031.280(b), 
and noting that Zubulake does not control in California .268 
 
[117] The Toshiba court is said to have “charted a new course in the cost-
shifting debate” in California that “could significantly affect the way 
litigators in the state approach cost-shifting arguments.”269  The case, 
however, left several key questions unanswered.  For example, what are 
“reasonable” expenses and “necessary” translations under section 
2031.280(b)?  Does the rule for back-up tapes apply to other forms of ESI, 
given that section 2031.280(b) refers broadly to “data compilations”?  The 
court did advise that the bounds of “reasonable” and “necessary” should 
                                                 
264 Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Lexar Media, 124 Cal. App. 4th 762, 767 
(App. Ct. 2004). 
265 Id.. at 766. 
266 Id. at 770. 
267 Id. at 769. 
268 Id. at 771-72.  The Toshiba court noted that while California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2031 does not contain a specific procedure for challenging the burden that cost-
shifting may place on the demanding party, insofar as a demanding party thinks the costs 
are unreasonable, that party must avail itself of generally applicable relief procedures, 
such as a protective order. Id. at 773. 
269 Linda G. Sharp, Restoration Drama: The Complexity of Electronic Discovery 
Requires Practitioners to Master New Litigation Skills, 28 L.A. LAW. 31 (2005). 
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be determined by sampling and may result in only partial cost-shifting or 
none at all; indeed, the demanding party may seek a protective order if it 
disputes either point.270  While any attempts to extend Toshiba’s holding 
to other platforms, such as deleted data on hard drives, are certain to meet 
with stiff resistance, California cases generally recognize that burdensome 
discovery requests may require cost-shifting to satisfy “principles of 
fundamental fairness,” since the requesting party is asking the producing 
party to do something special that falls beyond the call of routine 
discovery.271 
 
(B) NEW YORK 
 
[118] In stark contrast to the Oppenheimer presumption and the Zubulake 
approach for determining when to depart from that presumption, New 
York courts have held that under the state’s Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(CPLR), “the party seeking discovery should incur the costs incurred in 
the production of discovery material.”272  As such, whether it is 
appropriate to shift the costs of discovery of electronic information is not 
an issue in New York state court because the presumption at the outset is 
that the requesting party pays for discovery.  “Therefore, the analysis of 
whether electronic discovery should be permitted in New York is much 
simpler than it is in the federal courts.  The court need only determine 
whether the material is discoverable and whether the party seeking the 
                                                 
270 Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Lexar Media, 124 Cal. App. 4th 762, 773 
(App. Ct. 2004). 
271 See id. at 769 (“In some circumstances . . . principles of fundamental fairness require 
the demanding party to pay any significant ‘special attendant costs beyond those typically 
involved in responding to routine discovery.’”) (quoting San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. 
Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
272 Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).  See also Waltzer v. Tradescape & Co., L.L.C., 31 A.D.3d 302, 304 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“[A]s a general rule, . . . the party seeking discovery should bear 
the cost incurred in the production of discovery material.”); Rosado v. Mercedes-Benz of 
N. Am., Inc., 103 A.D.2d 395, 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“each party should shoulder 
the initial burden of financing his own suit, and based upon such a principle, it is the 
party seeking discovery of documents who should pay the cost of their translation”).  
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discovery is willing to bear the cost of production of the electronic 
material.”273 
 
[119] For example, in Lipco Electrical Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., the 
plaintiff sought e-discovery that the defendant claimed would be 
“extremely difficult, time consuming and expensive” to extract from its 
computer hard drives or back-up tapes.274  Unable to find state court 
precedent dealing with discovery of electronic information, the court cited 
Zubulake for the proposition that electronic documents are discoverable.275  
But the court then bypassed the federal analysis for deciding who should 
bear the cost of the discovery, finding that cost-shifting was not an issue 
because “under New York law, the party seeking discovery must bear the 
cost of production of the items for which discovery is sought.”276  
Therefore, the court refused to order the production of the ESI at issue 
until such time as the requesting party expressed a willingness to pay for 
the associated costs, subject to later apportionment on proper 
application.277 
 
[120] The Lipco court did not seem entirely comfortable with this 
outcome, noting that discovery of electronic information “raises a series of 
issues that were never envisioned by the drafters of the CPLR.”278  The 
court further noted that “[t]he cost of providing computer records can be 
rather substantial”279 and differs substantially from traditional paper 
discovery.280  The court’s analysis suggests that it might have reached a 
different conclusion but for the New York presumption in favor of 
discovery cost-shifting.  Unless and until changes are made to the CPLR 
or New York’s highest court addresses this issue,281 however, litigants in 
                                                 
273 Lipco, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9 (noting this was “especially true” where the 
requesting party “has been provided with hard copies of the electronically stored data”). 
274 Id. at *6.   
275 See id. at *7-8.   
276 Id. at *9. 
277 See id. at *10. 
278 Id. at *6. 
279 Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
280 See id. 
281 The New York Administrative Board of the Courts has established statewide uniform 
rules, effective January 17, 2006, governing the jurisdiction and procedures of courts in 
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New York state court can expect that costs associated with obtaining 
discovery of electronic information will be borne by the party requesting 
the materials, and obtaining those materials may be conditioned on the 
requesting party affirmatively agreeing to pay such costs.282 
 
(C) TEXAS AND MISSISSIPPI 
 
[121] Texas and Mississippi have identical rules governing discovery of 
electronic information that mandate cost-shifting in certain 
circumstances.283  Those rules require that where the requesting party 
specifically asks for ESI, and specifies the form in which it should be 
produced, the responding party must produce what responsive ESI is 
reasonably available to it in the ordinary course of business.284  If the 
responding party cannot, through reasonable efforts, retrieve the data or 
                                                                                                                         
the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court, which handles complicated commercial 
cases.  See Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, Dec. 
29, 2005, http://www.nycourts.gov/comdiv/CD-Rules.pdf.  Among other things, the new 
rules address the topic of discovery of electronic information.  Specifically, under Rule 8 
of the new section 202.70 of the Uniform Rules for N.Y.S. Trial Courts, attorneys are 
required to meet and confer about discovery issues including data preservation plans, 
relevant data identification, data production, cost allocation, identification of individuals 
responsible for data preservation, confidentiality and privilege issues, and designation of 
experts.  See also Uniform Rules for N.Y.S. Trial Courts, pt. 202, 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/rules/trialcourts/202.shtml#70. 
282 A New York court may, under certain circumstances, require the producing party 
initially bear certain costs associated with discovery production.  See, e.g., Weiller v. 
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 604285/04, 2004 WL 3245345, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 
2005) (ordering party to initially bear costs associated with compliance with preservation 
order covering “all databases, electronic material, tape media, electronic media, hard 
drives, computer disks and documents” as related to certain categories of documents).  
While the Weiller court was “not insensitive to the cost entailed in electronic discovery” 
and suggested it would, “at the appropriate juncture, entertain an application by 
defendants to obligate plaintiff, the requesting party, to absorb all or part of the cost of 
the e-discovery it seeks,” it refused to “constrain the production of possibly relevant 
evidence on account of the later need to allocate the cost.” Id.  
283 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).  In Texas, the general rule is that 
“the expense of producing items will be borne by the responding party and the expense of 
inspecting, sampling, testing, photographing, and copying items produced will be borne 
by the requesting party” absent a court order “for good cause.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.6 
(emphasis added). 
284 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).  
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information requested, or produce it in the form requested, it can file a 
motion.  If the motion is granted, the court must order the requesting party 
to pay for the reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps required to 
retrieve and produce the information.285   
 
[122] As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there is no “set in stone” 
standard or process for determining which ESI discovery expenses a court 
may be willing to shift to the requesting party and under what 
circumstances that shifting may occur.  Accordingly, a practitioner 
contemplating a cost-shifting motion should be familiar not only with the 
standard from the relevant jurisdiction, but also other persuasive authority 
that may have broken new or analogous ground. 
 
B. MOVING BEYOND BACK-UP TAPES:  SHIFTING OTHER DISCOVERY 
COSTS 
 
[123] While it is undisputed that the costs of restoring, translating, and 
electronically searching inaccessible data on back-up tapes are potentially 
eligible for shifting, those costs may represent a small portion of a client’s 
discovery budget.286  The million dollar question (literally) is when can the 
cost of attorney document review (which can skyrocket in discovery of 
ESI), and other expenses that identifying and producing ESI entail, be 
recovered from the requesting party? 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
285 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).  See also Bank of Am. Corp. v. 
SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 05-CV5-5564, 2006 WL 3093174 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 1, 2006) 
(“Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 . . . requires that whenever a court orders a 
responding party to produce information that is not ‘reasonably available,’ the court must 
require the requesting party to pay the ‘reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps 
required to retrieve and produce the information.’”).  
286 See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he estimated cost of 
restoring and searching the remaining backup tapes is $165,954.67, while the estimated 
cost of producing them (restoration and searching costs plus attorney and paralegal costs) 
is $ 273,649.39 ($19,003.43 for the five sample tapes, or $3,800.69 per tape, times 
seventy-two unrestored tapes), a difference of $ 107,694.72.”). 
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1. THE COST OF REVIEWING DOCUMENTS FOR RELEVANCE, PRIVILEGE, 
AND/OR OTHER PROTECTIONS 
 
[124] The cost of reviewing and analyzing ESI for production can be a 
substantial item on a party’s discovery bill.  Privilege review is a difficult 
task in the paper world, and it quickly can become unmanageable when 
ESI is involved.  One of the reasons ESI can hinder the discovery process 
and prove such a heavy draw on resources is that documents cannot just be 
handed over to the requesting party.  Rather, documents must first be 
reviewed by attorneys for relevance and responsiveness and, even more 
importantly, to exclude, redact, and/or mark with appropriate 
confidentiality designations those documents that contain material that is 
subject to the attorney-client privilege and/or other protections (such as 
privacy and trade secrets).  “The volume of such data, and the informality 
that attends the use of e-mail and some other types of electronically stored 
information, may make privilege determinations more difficult, and 
privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming.”287  
The task is further complicated by the existence of potentially privileged 
embedded data (e.g., earlier edits to a document) and metadata (e.g., 
identifying information automatically generated by word processing 
programs).288   
 
[125] Despite the high costs of reviewing ESI for privilege, courts thus far 
have been reluctant to shift the cost of that burden to the requesting party, 
sometimes explaining that the producing party is uniquely positioned to 
control the scope of those costs.289  Contrary to that rationale, however, is 
                                                 
287 FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(f) (amended 2006) comm. n.   
288 Id. 
289 See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290 (“[T]he responding party should always bear the 
cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has been converted to an 
accessible form” because (1) “the producing party has the exclusive ability to control the 
cost of reviewing the documents” and (2) “the producing party unilaterally decides on the 
review protocol.”); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 02 C 4721, 
2003 WL 21277129, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2003) (ruling that costs of a third party 
computer consultant to make copies of eight imaged hard drives and search for privileged 
communications should not be shifted to the requesting party); Byers v. Ill. State Police, 
No. 99 C 8195, 2002 WL 1264004, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2003) (“[P]laintiffs’ motion 
is granted to the extent that they bear the cost of licensing the old e-mail program, though 
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the legal requirement that parties conduct a thorough review for privilege 
and similar protections or risk waiving the privilege/protection—not only 
for the actual documents produced, but possibly as to entire subject 
matters.290  Some courts have even held that a privilege review consisting 
solely of an electronic search for certain keywords is insufficient to 
preserve the privilege.  Due to this conundrum, advocates should not 
unduly hesitate to argue that under Rules 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) the court 
should shift the costs of attorney review, or even deny particular discovery 
of certain electronic information altogether, in cases where the value of 
that discovery is outweighed by the burden of conducting an attorney 
review before production.291 Logistically, courts could require the 
producing party to estimate the cost of reviewing ESI for privilege and 
work product just as they do for search and restoration, and could require a 
similar sampling procedure to provide a factual basis for the estimate. 
 
2. OTHER ESI DISCOVERY COSTS TO CONSIDER SHIFTING 
 
[126] The expansion of the scope of ESI discovery gives rise to and 
escalates a number of other expenses that should be considered for 
inclusion in cost-shifting requests, even though the courts have not yet 
addressed whether those costs shifting.  Where the requesting party issues 
the typical, broad request for ESI and refuses to agree to accept anything 
                                                                                                                         
the defendants shall continue to bear the expense of any review for responsive 
documents, as well as for privileged or confidential material.”).   
290 See, e.g., Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 99-3298, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18763, at *6 (D.D. Cir. May 17, 2004) (stating that inadvertent disclosure waives 
the attorney-client privilege; “the scope of the waiver extends to all communications 
relating to the same subject matter, and will not be exempted, distinguished or balanced 
by ‘degrees of voluntariness,’ except in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” (citing In re 
Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
291See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. note (“[T]he producing 
party’s burdens in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege may weigh 
against permitting the requested discovery.”); see, e.g., In re General Instrument Corp. 
Sec. Litig., No. 96-C1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (non-
monetary costs are properly considered in assessing burden imposed by discovery; “the 
technical matter of retrieving the documents from the backup tapes would be just the start 
of the process”).  See also Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic 
Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 131 (2004) stating that (privilege review and 
production are as much costs of discovery as restoration and can be unduly burdensome 
or expensive because the volume of ESI is so much greater). 
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less than a burdensome, large-scale ESI preservation, collection, 
processing, review, and production effort, the responding party should 
consider whether to ask the court to shift the costs of those efforts to the 
extent the requested discovery is not denied outright.292  Potential costs to 
be shifted include: 
 
• Identifying all possible locations of discoverable data across a vast 
array of storage devices. 
• Familiarizing counsel with IT systems to prepare for eventual 
collection and production. 
• Preserving accessible data and halting a backup tape recycling 
program under a litigation hold.  
• Productivity losses suffered when forensic operations make 
computer systems unusable. 
• Disruption of normal business operations where billable in-house 
IT and other staff must attend to tasks related to ESI discovery. 
• The cost of purchasing special processing and review tools to 
allow for the forensically sound migration and production of ESI. 
• Processing large amounts of ESI to cull out data that does not meet 
basic relevance standards (e.g., date, file type, keywords, 
duplicates).  
• Engaging experts, consultants, and specialists for tasks beyond 
restoration and translation (which are already considered shiftable), 
such as forensic collection of ESI, sampling, affidavits, and 
testimony.   
• Producing ESI in the requested format.   
 
[127] For example, the complexity of a client’s network infrastructures 
and IT policies can make pinpointing the specific location of relevant ESI 
difficult and time consuming: 
 
In today’s increasingly digital workplaces, a small or 
medium-sized office may have five to 30 network servers 
that may be backed up to a single backup tape or backed up 
independently by server or function.  Furthermore, larger 
                                                 
292 See infra section IV.C.2.(d) 
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corporations typically operate by using hundreds or 
thousands of servers that may be segregated by function or 
task, business unit, or geography.  Each of these servers 
may be backed up by a system of multiple backup tapes.293 
 
Therefore, as discussed supra in Section III, one of the biggest challenges 
at the outset of a case is developing a thorough understanding of a client’s 
network infrastructure and IT systems.  Counsel must determine the 
client’s capabilities to search for and retrieve electronic data, and 
understand what data may be accessible and what data is arguably 
inaccessible. 
 
[128] Once located, the expense associated with preserving large amounts 
of accessible data can be enormous.  Zubulake suggests that a potential 
litigant could preserve accessible electronic evidence by simply taking “a 
mirror-image of the computer system” as soon as the duty “to preserve 
documents in the state they existed at that time” attaches.294  “Taking a 
mirror-image of an entire, active computer system, however, in practice, 
likely will prove to be a more formidable task, particularly for large 
companies, companies with multiple or overseas offices, or companies 
that have employees that use various electronic data systems (laptops, 
home PC’s, PDA’s, etc.).”295  While Zubulake states that parties need only 
halt recycling of tapes that store documents of key players which are not 
otherwise available,296 the cost of acquiring new tapes for that category of 
data backup can mount quickly, as can the cost of locating the backup 
tapes that have the data of relevant custodians or for the relevant time 
frame. 
 
[129] It also may be possible to recoup the cost of expert, consultant, and 
dedicated in-house staff time.  For example, in Portis v. City of Chicago, 
the plaintiffs’ law firm had compiled an electronic database of arrest 
                                                 
293 Sharp, supra note 269, at 34. 
294 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
295 Stephen D. Whetstone & Kara A. Millonzi, E-Discovery Document Preservation & 
Cost-Shifting: A Matter of Dollars and Sense 2005, at 6, available at 
http://www.stratify.com/stratify_resources/articles/Whetstone_DocPreserv_and_CostShif
ting.pdf (last visited March. 19, 2007). 
296 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. 
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records from paper and electronic data produced by the City, a time-
consuming and expensive project.297  After declining to participate in the 
compilation, the City decided it wanted to use the database, and it moved 
to compel production of the database.  The court granted the motion, but 
ordered the City to split the plaintiffs’ compilation costs, including the 
paralegals’ and computer consultant’s time spent on the project.298 
 
[130] Finally, there is the cost of formatting ESI for production.  Several 
cases that considered the production format for ESI before Amended Rule 
34(b) gave the format choice to the demanding party.  While a document 
request may still specify the form in which ESI is to be produced under 
Amended Rule 34(b), a responding party is also involved in determining 
the form of production because written responses must state the form the 
party intends to use for producing ESI if the requesting party does not 
specify a form or if the responding party objects to a form that the 
requesting party specified.FN  If the parties cannot agree on a production 
format and seek assistance in resolving the dispute, the court is not limited 
to the forms initially chosen by the requesting party, stated by the 
responding party, or specified in the rule.FN  Where the desired or ordered 
production format is burdensome to the producing party, shifting costs is 
one way to accommodate the burden.299  
 
C. MAKING THE ARGUMENT TO SHIFT COSTS IN THE DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 
 
[131] The following discussion outlines some steps practitioners may find 
useful in developing and tailoring their cost-shifting arguments.  While 
Zubulake is widely regarded as the most thorough consideration of cost-
                                                 
297 Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL 2512084, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 
2004).   
298 Id. at *2-4.  The plaintiffs calculated the cost based on the paralegals’ and computer 
consultant’s hourly billing rate, rather than the “out of pocket” rate actually paid by firm, 
i.e., the portion of their salaries actually paid by the firm for this work.  The court held 
the billing rate was proper because it represented the plaintiffs’ opportunity cost and put 
the parties in position they would be in had they collaborated on the project from the 
beginning.  Id. at *4-6. 
FN FED. R. CIV. PRO. 34(b). 
FN FED. R. CIV. PRO. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n. 
299 See infra at section IV(C)(2). 
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shifting to date, it is by no means settled law.  Case law remains sparse, 
and attorneys may need to refer to other jurisdictions by analogy.  Because 
the cost-shifting analysis is so fact-specific, courts develop and refine 
applicable standards with each new case on their dockets.  The contours of 
successful cost-shifting arguments also vary by jurisdiction.  This dynamic 
situation offers litigators a unique opportunity to advocate for cost 
allocations that are fair to their clients and helps further sound policy, 
while in the process shaping the evolution of discovery law. 
 
1. GATHER INFORMATION EARLY:  WHERE IS THE ESI, WHAT NEEDS TO BE 
DONE TO IT, AND WHAT WILL THAT COST? 
 
[132] When faced with a burdensome discovery request with ESI 
discovery issues, one of the first tasks for counsel is to acquire an 
understanding of how much ESI exists and how much it will cost to 
produce.  Regardless of the standard used, “the most important ingredient 
for the analytical process to produce a fair result is a particularization of 
the facts to support any challenge to discovery of electronic records.”300  
Gathering the facts to support a cost-shifting argument requires 
investigating the full range of sources of ESI, any restoration and 
translation requirements, and which experts and specialists may be needed 
to complete the job and testify in court.  
 
[133] The broad sweep of ESI that is potentially discoverable301 may 
require a litigant to conduct a forensically sound collection of data in 
many formats from a multitude of storage devices.  To gauge the potential 
cost of collection, counsel as well as appropriate business and IT 
personnel should survey the potentially relevant universe of data types and 
storage devices that parties may seek to discover, which could include: 
                                                 
300 Thompson v. U. S. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003).   
301 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) (stating that parties may inspect or 
otherwise access “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, 
images, and other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which 
information can be obtained ”).  The Civil Rules Advisory Committee that drafted the e-
discovery amendments noted that the amendment to Rule 34 was intended “to cover all 
current types of computer-based information” and “encompass future changes and 
developments.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) comm. n, cmt., n.  
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• Documents (including drafts), e-mails, instant messages, text 
messages, digitized voicemail, electronic calendars, web content 
(including intranets, extranets, blogs, web-based meetings, 
webcasts and podcasts), embedded and meta-data, fragmented and 
deleted data, software and source code. 
• Desktop computers, laptop computers, network and e-mail servers, 
removable media (including compact discs, flash memory sticks, 
PDAs, iPods), cell phones, and archival and back-up media. 
 
[134] The category of costs most likely to be shifted to the requesting 
party is that of searching and translating inaccessible electronic data into a 
usable form.  The effort and expense involved in transforming ESI in 
various formats and locations into information searchable and readable by 
humans, can multiply quickly when that data is stored with no plan for 
retrieval in the future, let alone the targeted retrieval and review that 
litigation requires.  Therefore, producing ESI is expensive, not only 
because of the additional time it requires, but also because of the 
specialized knowledge, services, and equipment of technical experts for 
everything from basic collection to testifying about the process in court. 
 
[135] Additional ESI processing costs should be appraised, such as culling 
data down to a relevant time frame and relevant custodians, de-duping, 
key word searching, review by attorneys for relevance and privilege, and 
formatting ESI prior to production or for use as evidence at trial.  Various 
document management and review tools may be required as each of these 
stages, which could involve licensing and other expenditures.  
 
[136] Outside vendor, consultants, and expert expenses lie beyond the pale 
of ordinary business and litigation expenditures, so they make good 
candidates for cost-shifting.  Counsel should assess categories of expert 
costs, including data collection, restoration and translation (including 
computer forensics), and expert testimony in court pertaining to discovery 
of electronic information issues.  Additionally, keeping expert costs under 
control (e.g., insisting on a detailed budget, getting bids, monitoring costs) 
will enhance cost-shifting arguments to the court (and benefit attorney-
client relationships where such arguments fail). 
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[137] ESI may be inaccessible or so broadly diffused across platforms and 
devices that it is difficult to locate.  Therefore, the need for experts in the 
discovery of electronic information may arise as early as the data 
collection stage, and specialists may be required to identify, collect, and 
analyze run-of-the-mill records that another party requests.  This is 
traditionally the work of lawyers or in-house personnel, and the addition 
of consultants and/or experts fundamentally changes the cost structure of 
litigation.  Additionally, most litigants will need to retain outside vendors 
to perform the restoration and translation of inaccessible data.  These tasks 
may include computer forensics work,302 such as making mirror-images of 
hard drives and reconstructing lost, deleted, or damaged data.303  
Restoration and translation predicates have no analog in traditional 
discovery, making them indisputable additions to the cost of discovery 
since the paper age.  Furthermore, these are time-consuming, highly 
technical exercises that require many hours of work by expensive 
personnel. 
 
[138] A litigant may also need to engage an expert witness to testify to the 
efficacy of its discovery technology, the projected cost of responding to a 
discovery request, the technical implications of various data retention 
programs, etc.  Due to its technical nature, courts are increasingly calling 
for experts to testify in court regarding discovery requirements.  An 
accusation of failure to preserve relevant ESI may lead the court to require 
                                                 
302 Forensic examinations of hard drives and servers by outside experts raise additional, 
potentially costly issues: the risks of disclosing privileged material and of violating 
privacy laws.  See GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION:  
E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 142-44 
(American Bar Association 2006).  Because a forensics expert can access any data stored 
on the computer she investigates, counsel may need to devise ways to screen for privilege 
and privacy on the entire machine, regardless of potential responsiveness to the discovery 
request.  This requirement imposes additional cost up front, as well as potential liability 
or loss of litigation leverage down the road as a result of waived privilege or disclosure of 
protected private data. 
303 Courts may be more receptive to cost-shifting arguments where the other side requests 
discovery that can only be obtained by forensic work.  For instance, in the employment 
case Laurin v. Pokoik, the plaintiff sought to discover the date certain ledger entries had 
been made in the defendant’s computer, which could only be ascertained through 
forensics.  In ruling on the request, the magistrate stated that the proper procedure would 
be for the plaintiff to move to compel at her own expense. Laurin v. Pokoik, No. 02Civ. 
1938, 2004 WL 2724767, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004).   
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investigation by a neutral third-party expert.  Again, these expenses 
exceed the traditional bounds of discovery.  Attorneys should incorporate 
fees for testifying and investigatory experts into their discovery cost 
estimates early in the case, and advocate for cost-shifting wherever the 
benefit-burden analysis and fairness considerations require it. 
 
[139] Finally, because discovery of electronic information raises a number 
of cost questions absent from traditional discovery, litigants hoping to 
resolve them in their favor should assess and address the above 
considerations as early in the case as possible.  In this vein, the amended 
FRCP call for early discussion of discovery costs in several places, which 
can help lay the foundation for future cost-shifting arguments.  Ultimately, 
a party that knows where its EIS is, what needs to be done to it, and how 
much that will cost, will be in the best position to urge a courts to shift the 
cost of some or all of its discovery costs. 
 
2. LITIGATING THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ESI DISCOVERY 
 
[140] Under Rules 26(b)(2)(B) 26(b)(2)(C), and 26(c), the responding 
party may move for a protective order or the requesting party may move to 
compel when there is a dispute over the discovery of ESI.  The FRCP and 
case law require courts resolving those disputes to balance the benefits of 
the ESI discovery at issue with the burden, including expense, on the 
producing party.  The burden-benefit analysis is always a case-specific 
inquiry and a court’s willingness to shift costs will vary with the issues at 
stake.  For instance, drafts of contracts in a case may hold more benefit 
where intent is an issue than in a straight breach of contract case.304   
 
[141] While discovery of electronic information can burden the producing 
party on a number of fronts, urging the court that all ESI discovery in a 
case is burdensome is not credible, as it is undisputed that computer 
technology can make the production of  responsive information easier in 
some respects.305  Also, any benefit the discovery brings to the producing 
                                                 
304 See also  Cognex Corp. v. Electro Sci. Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01CV10287RCL, 
2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (finding little benefit in recovering 
deleted e-mails in patent case as compared to an employment discrimination case). 
305 See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[E]lectronic evidence is 
frequently cheaper and easier to produce than paper evidence because it can be searched 
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party is weighed against cost-shifting under all relevant tests:  Zubulake, 
Rule 26(c), etc.  Therefore, counsel for the responding party should assess 
any possible benefit to the requesting party in producing ESI and be 
prepared to modulate cost-shifting arguments accordingly in anticipation 
that the requesting party will point to those benefits to defuse requests to 
shoulder an ESI discovery bill. 
 
[142] Shifting costs may be an appropriate balancing mechanism in a 
variety of circumstances, some of which are discussed below.  In addition, 
effective cost-shifting arguments will highlight the legal and factual 
considerations that limit the likely benefits of the requested discovery.  
They also will distinguish unfavorable cases where the legal theories 
and/or factual circumstances at issue made the benefit to the requesting 
party greater, or the burden to the producing party lesser, than in the case 
at hand. 
 
(A) THE “NOT REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE” THRESHOLD IS A MOVING 
TARGET 
 
[143] Multiple information systems and constant technological change 
make the parameters of accessibility elusive.306  Zubulake attempted to 
break the world of ESI down into five categories (active, online data; near-
line data; offline storage/archives; backup tapes; and erased, fragmented or 
damaged data) and then performed a cost-shifting analysis only as to the 
last two categories of “inaccessible” data307  Electronic data storage is 
more complicated and dynamic that this, however, a party need not 
                                                                                                                         
automatically, key words can be run for privilege checks, and the production can be made 
in electronic form, obviating the need for mass photocopying.”); Itzenson v. Hartford 
Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 99-4475, 2000 WL 1507422, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct 
10, 2000) (rejecting defendant’s claim that searching thousands of electronic files for a 
particular subject would be unduly burdensome). See generally Shira A. Scheindlin & 
Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the 
Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 364 (2000) (“By comparison [to the time it would take to 
search through 100,000 pages of paper], the average office computer could search all of 
the documents for specific words or combinations of words in minute, perhaps less.”). 
306 PAUL & NEARON, supra note 302, at 14 (“when the rules speak about whether 
something is ‘reasonable’ to do, the adjudication will depend more on the enveloping 
system than it will on the information itself”). 
307 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-319. 
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abandon a cost-shifting argument simply because the discovery at issue 
does not fall into one of the two categories blessed by Zubulake. 
 
[144] Courts generally agree that restoring archival or deleted data 
presents sufficient burden such as to warrant the consideration of cost-
shifting.308  Litigants can generally term such ESI as “not reasonably 
accessible” without much controversy.  Other categories are not so clear.  
The “not reasonably accessible” standard was meant to be a moving target.  
“It is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological 
features that may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically 
stored information.”309  This flexibility can be used to try to convince the 
court that a cost-shifting argument succeeds on the particularized facts of a 
case. 
 
(I)  ACTIVE DATA MAY BE INACCESSIBLE FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES. 
 
[145] Even active ESI may pose undue burden and expense when being 
produced for litigation.  The degree of burden and expense may depend on 
where the data resides.  For example: 
 
• Proprietary systems, used by many businesses from 
technology companies to accounting firms, may not have 
readily available searching and translation/production tools 
and requesting parties often cannot comprehend 
information produced from them in native format.FN 
• Relational databases, which exist in fluid form, must be 
manipulated to produce relevant, responsive information 
and can present potentially large confidentiality and 
privilege problems.310 
                                                 
308 E.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) 
(“[I]t is a well accepted proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be e-mails 
or otherwise, are discoverable”; ordering mirror imaging of defendant’s hard drive where 
plaintiff had agreed to pay cost.); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(shifting some cost of restoring archival data). 
309 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. n.   
FN Amended Rule 34(a) does require that, if necessary, a responding party “translate” 
information it produces into a “reasonably usable” form.  The Committee Note to Rule 
34(b) further states that “[u]nder some circumstances, the responding party may need to 
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• Computer systems that are significantly more complicated 
than typical systems found a most businesses—for example 
where the company recently has undergone numerous 
mergers or acquisitions and thus data on certain areas of the 
system are extremely difficult to access—may be held to be 
inaccessible due to the system’s extraordinary 
“complexity.”311 
 
[146] Each of these actively used data sources from which data would be 
difficult or expensive to extract could present strong arguments for cost-
shifting under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) based on burden or expense. 
 
(II) BUSINESSES SHOULD BE FREE TO CHANGE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
WITHOUT BEING PENALIZED IN LATER LITIGATION. 
 
[147] The FRCP Amendments recognize that technology will continue to 
evolve, and leave the benefit-burden standard flexible to accommodate 
that change.312  Nonetheless, pre-amendment case law suggests that courts 
may decline to deem ESI “not reasonably accessible” where the 
inaccessibility results from the client’s choice to decommission a system.  
For example, in Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), 
                                                                                                                         
provide some reasonable amount of technical support, information on application 
software, or other reasonable assistance to enable the requesting party to use the 
information.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n.   
310 E.g., Multitech. Services, L.P. v. Verizon S.W., No. CIV A 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 
1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (holding that while a report requested from 
defendant’s client databases was accessible, the plaintiff has to pay half the cost of 
creating it.  Finding Zubulake inapposite, the court nonetheless ran through the factors 
and concluded that splitting the expense provided the defendant with incentive to control 
costs while also recognizing that only the plaintiff would benefit from the report’s 
creation and production). 
311 PAUL AND NEARON, supra note 301, at 130 (2006) (“[W]hat the committee is 
addressing [in Rule 26(b)(2)(B)] is . . . the difficulty of access because of the complexity 
of a system.”) (emphasis omitted). 
FN See id. at 84-87 (summarizing numerous “negative” comments submitted in response 
to a discussion draft of amended Rule 34 regarding production in “native format,” 
including a lengthy comment submitted by Microsoft).  
312 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. N., cmt. n. (“It is not possible to 
define in a rule the different types of technological features that may affect the burdens 
and costs of accessing electronically stored information.”).   
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Inc., Judge Scheindlin (of Zubulake fame) applied her cost-shifting factors 
to archival optical discs that had been made inaccessible when the 
defendant merged with another company and decommissioned the Unix 
servers that accessed the discs.313  With four factors weighing against cost-
shifting and the rest neutral, the court denied costs even though the 
defendant no longer had the hardware and software needed to access 
data.314 
 
[148] There are strong arguments that Xpedior is has been superseded by 
Amended Rule 26(b)(2), which states that a responding party does not 
have to produce ESI from sources that are “not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost”  While potential litigants may have some 
duty to maintain reasonable access to ESI expected to be relevant to 
litigation within a reasonable future time period, the force behind the 
Amendments and current court decisions is to find fair ways to allocate 
discovery costs in a rapidly changing technology environment.  Inevitably 
and by their nature, electronic storage platforms and media will come and 
go, a fact that should be considered by courts in judging accessibility. 
 
(III) ALTERNATIVE SOURCES CAN PRECLUDE THE NEED TO PRODUCE 
INACCESSIBLE ESI. 
 
[149] Responding parties can challenge requests to produce inaccessible 
ESI and avoid the resulting cost-shifting spats if the information is 
available elsewhere in other formats.  “In many circumstances the 
requesting party should obtain and evaluate the information from 
[reasonably accessible] sources before insisting that the responding party 
search and produce information contained on sources that are not  
reasonably accessible.”315   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
313 Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 
465 (S. D.N.Y. 2003).   
314 Id. at 467. 
315 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. n., cmt. n.   
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[150] In seeking to show that information requested from inaccessible 
sources is available elsewhere, counsel should consider questions such as: 
 
• Is there evidence that relevant data has been not been 
deleted, and thus is available from accessible sources? 
• Is there a company policy requiring hard copy print-outs of 
the inaccessible data?316   
• Can the client identify paper duplicates of the inaccessible 
electronic files? 
• Is the information available from an outside source, such as 
the client’s auditors? 
•  
If information is available elsewhere at less expense, the requesting party 
should have to pay the cost of acquiring it for more.317 
 
(IV) CAUTION:  REGULATORY RETENTION REQUIREMENTS MAY SERVE AS 
ACCESSIBILITY BENCHMARKS. 
 
[151] Clients subject to document retention requirements by regulatory 
agencies such as the IRS or SEC may find that courts presume the 
accessibility of any ESI falling within those requirements.318  This issue is 
best addressed with clients before litigation.  A robust data lifecycle 
management policy319 will not only comply with those regulations but also 
ensure the most-efficient and easiest access possible to electronic data that 
is required to be retained.  Most companies face some sort of retention 
mandate, and are best advised not to have the only source of such ESI be a 
pile of unmarked backup tapes, as a court is unlikely to entertain a cost-
shifting argument in this instance.  On the other hand, regulatory 
requirements may create alternative sources, such as auditors or 
examiners, of ESI that the party has otherwise destroyed.  A court may 
                                                 
316 See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. Williams Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (attempting to show alternative sources failed where no company policy 
required hard copies).  Nothing in Amended Rule 34(b), prevents the court from ordering 
that paper is a “reasonably usable” form where the only other source for the information 
is “not reasonably accessible.”  
317 Id. at 430. 
318 See PAUL & NEARON, supra note 301, at 139-41.   
319 See supra section  III.E.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 3 
 
 77
require a party to go to those sources for electronic data no longer 
internally accessible to a responding party before it will consider whether 
data must be restored under Rule 26(b)(2) and at whose cost. 
 
(B) SAMPLING ITSELF CAN PRESENT AN UNDUE BURDEN 
 
[152] The Committee Note to Amended Rule 26(b)(2)(B) contemplates 
sampling in certain circumstances and courts will likely see a trend of 
increasing requests to order use of that methodology for cost-shifting 
analysis or otherwise.  While a potentially powerful cost-cutting tool, 
sampling also can raise its own issues of burden and cost depending on the 
circumstances.  When a responding party asserts that electronic data is not 
reasonably accessible, “[t]he requesting party may need discovery to test 
this assertion,” which “might take the form of requiring the responding 
party to conduct a sampling of information contained” on the inaccessible 
sources.320  Nearly all courts considering accessibility and whether to shift 
costs have required sampling of the data in question,321 and amended Rule 
34 explicitly permits the inspection, testing, and sampling of ESI.322  The 
purpose of sampling is two-fold:  to estimate the cost of producing the full 
request, and to develop the factual record sufficiently to narrow that 
request. 
 
[153] Sampling alone may be unduly burdensome for the responding 
party:  “where the cost of a sample restoration is significant compared to 
the value of the suit, or where the suit itself is patently frivolous, even this 
minor effort may be inappropriate.”323  Parties may raise the burden or 
intrusiveness of sampling under Amended Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c).324  
Conversely, sampling can serve the responding party’s interests where it 
provides an opportunity to educate the court on the breathtaking expense 
and limited value of what the other party has asked for.  Hard data 
                                                 
320 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), (amended 2006) advisory comm. note, cmt. n. 
321 E.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.   
322 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) comm. n., cmt. n.  Rule 34 was changed “to 
make clear that parties may request an opportunity to test or sample materials sought 
under the rule.” Id.  
323 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 n.77.   
324 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) comm. n., cmt. n. 
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showing the court that the requesting party seeks an “awfully expensive 
needle to justify searching a haystack” could do just that.325 
 
[154] There are of course other ways to develop the factual record 
sufficiently to allow a court to rule on cost-shifting questions.  The parties 
are limited only “by the court’s own imagination and the quality and 
quantity of factual information provided by the parties to be used by the 
court in evaluating the Rule 26(b)(2) factors.”326  Armed with the detailed 
understanding provided by the fact-gathering process and through 
discovery or meet-and-confer conferences, counsel can encourage the 
court to rule on the facts before it without the expense and delay of 
sampling.  Advocates also can forestall sampling with issue-narrowing 
motions.327 
 
(C) THE AMOUNT OF DISCOVERY EXPENSE THAT WILL TRIGGER COST-
SHIFTING IS FACT-SPECIFIC 
 
[155] The case-specific nature of the benefit-burden analysis suggests that 
almost any ESI discovery expense may make a good candidate for cost-
shifting under Rule 26(b)(2), depending on the circumstances of the case.  
As a result, the amount of out-of-pocket discovery expense that will 
convince a court to shift costs may vary widely.  The Supreme Court has 
generally directed courts to look at “whether the cost is substantial[,] not 
whether it is ‘modest’ in relation to ability to pay.”328  For example, in the 
discovery of electronic information context, a New York district court 
shifted the mere $1,680 it would cost one of the defendants to create a 
special program to extract documents from inaccessible sources.329   
 
                                                 
325 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
326 Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99 (D. Md. 2003). 
327 E.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3rd 1353, 1365 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(holding the court has power to stay discovery where it may be mooted by pending, 
potentially dispositive motions on issues to which discovery is directed). 
328 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1978) (holding that a 
$16,000 expense to compile class member list was “substantial” and should be shifted to 
plaintiff, who sought the information). 
329 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 23, 1996).   
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[156] When the court evaluates burden by comparing the cost of 
production to the amount in controversy, that will make costs less likely to 
shift in a high-stakes case (e.g., patent litigation) than in a smaller-stakes 
case (e.g., a contract dispute) unless the costs at issue are high.  For 
example, the court in Zubulake concluded that a factor of “several fold” 
between the cost of production and the stakes ($273,650 to produce versus 
a potential multi-million dollar recovery) weighed against cost-shifting, 
noting that in a multi-million dollar case, “the cost of restoration is surely 
not ‘significantly disproportionate’ to the projected value” of the case.330  
Litigants in high-stakes cases where the amount of alleged damages is 
speculative, will be subject to significant dispute, and will depend on 
expert testimony should argue against the use of “amount in controversy” 
as the basis for evaluating whether burden is undue. 
 
(D) COST-SHIFTING IS APPROPRIATE WHERE DISCOVERY REQUESTS ARE 
TOO BROAD 
 
[157] As ESI has raised the specter of endlessly broad discovery, courts 
have used cost-shifting to help parties think twice about the information 
they seek.  “Where a party multiplies the litigation costs by seeking 
expansive rather than targeted discovery, that party should bear the 
expense.”331  This standard can be particularly useful for parties that 
receive egregiously broad discovery requests that are typical in certain 
types of complex litigation.  By the same token, the more specific a 
discovery request is, the more reasonable it remains for the responding 
party to pay its own expenses.332  In this vein, the end game of a cost-
shifting argument may be not a reimbursement check, but a narrower 
discovery request.   
 
[158] Courts likely will be friendly to arguments that couch cost-shifting 
in the context of encouraging thoughtful, targeted discovery.  Further, 
                                                 
330 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
331 Rowe Entm’t, Inc., v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
332 See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 284 (requesting that all e-mails from five UBS 
employees during two-year period was sufficiently specific to weigh against full cost-
shifting, so court shifting only 25% of cost to requesting party); see also Zubulake I, 217 
F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Specificity is surely the touchstone of any good 
discovery request.”). 
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clients may prefer to pay to respond to a narrowly tailored request than 
have the hollow victory of reimbursement for an exhaustive production 
that disrupts normal business.  The threat of cost-shifting as a pressure to 
narrow discovery requests also has good consequences at both the 
practical and policy levels.  Practically speaking, narrower discovery 
promotes judicial efficiency and reduces costs to both parties.  From a 
policy perspective, requiring a requesting party to pay for broad discovery 
helps to prevent fishing expeditions and the use of discovery as a sword to 
induce settlement.  
 
[159] When collecting ESI, there are various options to narrow the scope 
of discovery requests, some of which are generally applicable to the 
discovery context and some of which are specific to discovery of 
electronic information.  They include: 
 
• Urging the requesting party to reword or drop vague qualifiers, 
such as those calling for “all documents relating to” a particular 
subject matter; 
• Limiting the custodians, dates, sources, and locations of electronic 
data to be searched; 
• Using keyword searches and other culling tools; and 
• Providing an initial “sample” of documents as the starting point for 
negotiations.333 
 
[160] Advocates who are fluent in the methods and technologies available 
to narrow discovery requests and reduce the expense of production will be 
more effective in resolving cost issues both for meet-and-confer efforts 
and for the court.  Counsel and their clients should also agree on how 
narrowly the requests should be drawn to warrant a compromise on costs. 
 
(E) PRODUCTION FORMATS MAY RAISE ADDITIONAL BURDEN ISSUES 
 
[161] The format for production is an important feature of the production 
of ESI.  Requesting parties now may specify the desired production format 
in discovery requests to “facilitate the orderly, efficient, and cost-effective 
                                                 
333 See supra, section III. 
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discovery of electronically stored information.”334  Though the requesting 
party may now specify a preferred format, the responding party should 
argue against producing formats that incur unreasonable costs.  If a dispute 
over format is brought to the court for resolution, the responding party 
should consider arguing that to the extent the court orders production in a 
burdensome format the requesting party should shoulder some or all of the 
extra burden involved in producing in that format. 
 
[162] Before meeting and conferring on discovery, counsel should become 
familiar with the technical and cost implications to the particular client of 
producing in the various electronic formats that the other side may request.  
The categories of electronic formats, from least to most potentially 
problematic to produce, include: 
 
• Images (most commonly .tiff or .pdf files; may be 
electronic or paper printouts); 
• Native format (requires appropriate software on requester’s 
part), with or without metadata; 
• Copies of backup or archival media (with software to 
access, or in readable form); 
• Mirror images of hard drives; and 
• Direct access to computer systems. 
 
[163] Where the requesting party does not specify a form, Rule 34(b) 
allows the responding party to produce ESI in reasonably useful form or in 
the form in which it is “ordinarily maintained.”335  The Advisory 
Committee note to Rule 34(b) clarifies that the Rule requires the 
responding party to “translate” data that is not “reasonably usable.”336  
Under some circumstances, the responding party “may need to provide 
some reasonable amount of technical support, information on application 
software, or other reasonable assistance to enable the requesting party to 
use the information.”337  Responding parties should consider arguing 
                                                 
334 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n. 
 
335 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006). 
336 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n. 
337 Id. 
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against these burdensome forms of production under the benefit-burden 
test of Rule 26 and asking for cost-shifting in the event a burdensome 
form of production is required.338 
 
[164] Native format production has been endorsed by a number of 
courts.339 Producing in native forma, however, requires additional 
technical efforts—such as locking data so the requesting party cannot alter 
it and a more complex method of electronic Bates stamping—and 
additional privilege and relevance review of metadata, deleted data, and 
fragmented data, which may in turn require further technical measures to 
effect electronic redaction.  There are also well-documented problems 
with the use of native format files as evidence in litigation.  Responding 
parties should resist a format that would require production in more than 
one form as contrary to Rule 34(b)(iii), but it is difficult to conceive of 
how “native” files can be used in depositions, to support motions, or at 
trial without further processing and duplicative production.   
 
3. BALANCED VERSUS LOPSIDED CASES 
 
[165] Since cost-shifting involves a case-specific analysis, advocates must 
tailor arguments on the issue to suit the case at hand.  In particular, 
litigants may face different discovery dynamics depending on whether a 
case is “balanced” (parties with roughly equal resources and discovery 
                                                 
338 Id. (“The questions whether a producing party should be required to convert [not 
reasonably usable data] to a more usable form, or should be required to produce it at all, 
should be addressed under Rule 26(b)(2)(B)”).  For examples of recent district court 
decisions approving lower-cost production formats, see Zakre v. Norddeutsche 
Landesbank, No. 03 Civ. 0257, 2004 WL 764895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2004) 
(approving production of 204,000 emails in text-readable format without any further 
relevance cut where this was “in as close a form as possible as they are kept in the usual 
course of business”); In re Lorazepan and Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 
43, 47 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that no index was required if CD-ROMs were searchable; 
“[t]he glory of electronic information is not merely that it saves space but that it permits 
the computer to search for words or ‘strings’ of text in seconds”). 
339 E.g., Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Technologies, LLC , No. 04 C 3109, 2006 WL 665005 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 8, 2006); Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005); 
In re Verisign, Inc. Securities Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 10, 2004); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:98CV2876, 2004 WL 3192729 
(N.D. Ohio July 16, 2004).   
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needs), or “lopsided” (parties with significantly different resources and 
discovery needs).  These differing dynamics may require different 
discovery strategies and cost-shifting arguments. 
 
[166] Courts will consider the parties’ resources under any of the cost-
shifting tests.  In a balanced case, the relative equality in resources weighs 
for cost-shifting in either direction.340  Therefore, any expansive discovery 
request made by a party in a relatively balanced case will (1) be made by 
the other side in return, (2) put the party at risk for defending against a 
cost-shifting request, and (3) make the court less sympathetic to the 
party’s own cost-shifting arguments for the other side’s requests.  
Resources of course weigh against cost-shifting when the requesting party 
is significantly smaller than the party requesting to have costs shifted.  
This is no reason, though, not to argue for cost-shifting, cost-sharing, or 
denial of discovery.  In Zubulake, for instance, the court found that the fact 
that the plaintiff was an individual and UBS a large corporation weighed 
against cost-shifting.  The court nonetheless went on to consider the 
plaintiff’s personal wealth and her lawyers’ ability to advance costs, and 
assigned 25% of the costs of electronic data recovery to her.341   
 
[167] Where the requesting party appears to be disadvantaged by size, 
advocates for the responding party should remind the court that size 
disparity alone does not justify burdensome discovery and that the fairest 
solution may be to deny the request or require that it be narrowed 
significantly.  Where discovery is allowed, the respective parties’ 
resources should not be the controlling factor in the cost-shifting 
determination.  It costs almost nothing for a requesting party to put 
together and issue an extremely broad, highly burdensome request for 
production of documents.  Even a “small” requesting party can gain a 
significant strategic advantage by sending out a boilerplate request, which 
then effectively puts the onus on the responding party to either spend time 
and money preserving, collecting, processing, reviewing, and producing 
enormous volumes of ESI early on in the case or spend time and money 
                                                 
340 See, e.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (D. Cal. 2003) (taking into 
account parties’ similar in situation in patent litigation when splitting the cost of source 
code extraction). 
341 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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litigating discovery disputes.  This “Hobson’s Choice” allows the 
requesting party to abuse the discovery process by putting this pressure on 
the responding party, even where it is “big,” to settle the matter rather than 
litigate on the merits. 
 
[168] This dynamic is exacerbated by the fact that in “lopsided” cases a 
“small” requesting party typically has little or no ESI to be produced in the 
litigation.  That means that the requesting party has no incentive to be 
reasonable in fashioning and negotiating the scope of requests for 
production of ESI—it will have no need for the responding party to be 
reasonable in kind as to its own requests.   
 
[169] In many types of litigation, the cost of ESI production in “lopsided” 
cases has caused the playing field to be imbalanced throughout the 
discovery process, in favor of the “small” requesting party with no ESI of 
its own to produce.  Only when courts take all of the relevant factors into 
consideration in “lopsided” cases can the shifting of certain costs of ESI 
production to the requesting party truly begin to balance that playing field.  
It may be necessary for courts to begin taking a very different approach to 
the shifting and sharing of ESI discovery costs to bring modern-day, 
complex litigation back into alignment with the mandate of FRCP 1. 
 
4. REQUESTING THAT PARTICULAR DISCOVERY BE DENIED 
 
[170] It is important to remember that cost-shifting arguments are only a 
back-up to asking the court to deny burdensome discovery requests 
outright.  In some cases, outright denial may be more appropriate 
protection from burdensome discovery requests than a cost-shifting order.  
Attorneys should not become so enamored with the idea of shifting 
discovery costs that they neglect to consider protesting the underlying 
request in the first instance.  Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) provide that a 
court may modify or deny a discovery request if the requesting party has 
had ample opportunity to obtain discovery, if the material sought is 
available elsewhere, or if the request is unduly burdensome.  Two cases 
show district courts deciding to deny discovery instead of shifting costs, 
based on those policy grounds. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 3 
 
 85
[171] In In re General Instrument Corporate Securities Litigation, the 
court denied discovery of e-mails from back-up tapes even though 
production would not be unduly expensive, because the projected benefit 
failed to outweigh the burden and ample opportunity for discovery had 
been availed.342  The defendant had already produced 110,000 pages from 
one year of back-up tapes when the plaintiffs moved to compel further 
production, despite having stated at an earlier status conference that 
discovery had concluded.  As to the benefit, the court found that the large 
number of documents already produced made it unlikely that additional 
documents were necessary, and that the plaintiffs had failed to identify 
“any specific factual issue” that would make it so.343  As to the burden, the 
court found that it would be significant given the volume of the e-mail at 
issue and the necessity of reviewing it for privilege and responsiveness.344  
With expert discovery beginning, the court concluded that “[f]orcing 
defense counsel to engage in document review would necessarily distract 
their energies from the other parts of this ongoing litigation.”345 
 
[172] In Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., the court 
denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel restoration and production of data 
from 820 back-up tapes covering a period of nine years, even where 
plaintiffs offered to pay the full cost and even though such a broad search 
would inevitably unearth relevant documents.346  For one, the defendant 
had “already conducted an extensive search for relevant documents” and 
produced thirty boxes of documents from every employee who had 
worked on the product in dispute.347  “At some point, the adversary system 
needs to say ‘enough is enough’ and recognize that the cost of seeking 
every relevant piece of discovery is not reasonable.”348  The court also 
found there would be limited benefit derived from the discovery, 
distinguishing the patent infringement case before it from employment 
                                                 
342 In re General Instrument Sec. Litig. , No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *5-6 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999). 
343 Id. at *6.   
344 Id.  
345 Id.  
346 Cognex Corp. v. Electro Sci. Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 
32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002). 
347 Id. at *1. 
348 Id. at *5. 
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discrimination cases where relevant e-mails might be deleted by guilty 
individuals but remain on backup tapes.349  Finally, noting that willingness 
to pay does not waive limits on the number of interrogatories and 
depositions a party can take, the court concluded that “[t]here is something 
inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a 
heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it,” and that 
“[t]he sense of fairness underpinning our system of justice will not be 
enhanced by the courts participating in giving strategic advantage to those 
with deeper pockets.”350 
 
[173] The outright denial of superfluous or unduly burdensome discovery 
requests serves FRCP 1’s policy goals of speedy cost-efficient resolution.  
It also prevents the potential unfairness of allowing parties to “buy” 
disproportionate discovery, which would represent a serious mishandling 
of the cost-shifting principles inherent in Rule 26 and applied in federal 
case law.351 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
[174] Advances in litigation technologies provide a great deal of promise 
for litigants.  Those technologies are still in their relative infancies, and we 
are only beginning to scratch the surface of their potential to limit the 
costs of discovery.  As concept and other forms of searching 
methodologies mature and become more cost-effective, it is likely that 
they will become more streamlined and accepted by courts.  In light of the 
growing complexity of the world of ESI, innovation and aggressive 
advocacy for use of those technologies is needed to improve the efficiency 
of the discovery process, and not just at the review and production stages.  
The increasing need to make early decisions about the scope of relevant 
documents during preservation efforts warrants the use of efficient 
technologies at that stage as well.   
 
                                                 
349 Id.   
350 Id.   
351 FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also FED. R. CIV. P  26(b)(2)(b) comm.. n. (“A requesting 
party’s willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the court in 
determining whether there is good cause [for production].”) 
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[175] While the courts are slowly moving away from the presumption that 
the producing party pays for the cost of production, litigants need to 
become better versed at articulating in plain English the unique burdens 
involved in locating and producing ESI.  Cost-shifting rules remain 
jurisdiction specific, with some forums more receptive to cost-shifting 
arguments than others.  However, the arsenal of arguments to be 
considered is wide-ranging and should provide some measure of relief for 
clients facing enormous discovery bills. 
 
[176] Finally, litigants should be aggressive in invoking FRCP 1 as a basis 
for the innovative use of search strategies and cost-shifting to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs across the board in discovery.  It is only in this 
way that the mandate of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action will become a reality in discovery. 
